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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST WORLD YOUTH FESTIVALS: Moscow 1957 - Vienna 1959

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This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
It is based on information avail-
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Foreword

The Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students, held at Moscow 28 July - 11 August 1957, was the largest, costliest and most spectacular youth gathering in history and as such must be regarded as a world political event of major significance. A critical review of the event leads to the conclusion that it probably achieved most of the propaganda and organizational aims of its Communist sponsors. Nevertheless, Soviet youth - and presumably the Moscow citizenry as well - had been exposed, as the head of the Komsomol, Alexander Shelepin, admitted, to the "penetration into our midst of an ideology, morals and habits that are alien to us."

After several months of hesitation, while the results of the Moscow Festival were assessed, the International Communist youth front organizations canvassed a number of possible sites in both the Bloc and the Free World and finally decided to hold the Seventh Festival in Vienna from 26 July to 4 August 1959. This will mark the first occasion on which the Youth Festival has been held outside the Soviet Bloc. Apparently sensitive to the criticism that the Moscow Festival was too ambitious and long-drawn-out, the sponsors have decided to reduce the length of the gathering by five days and the size of the delegations by approximately 50 percent, i.e. to a total of about 17,000. There is no reason to believe that the Communists attach any less importance to the 1959 Festival than to previous ones, but they probably have concluded that Communist control could be better maintained in a non-Communist setting if the size of the delegations is not too large. The attitude of the Vienna authorities who requested that the Festival be kept within modest limits so as not to interfere too much with the normally heavy midsummer tourist traffic may also have affected the sponsors' decisions. Finally, the need for reducing the cost, as compared to the heavy expenses of the Moscow event, may also have been a factor.

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In weighing the risks involved in holding the Festival outside the Iron Curtain, the sponsors presumably have faced the fact that although the official delegates will mostly be under tight Communist discipline, there will undoubtedly be present a larger percentage of non-Communist youth as visitors and observers than on previous occasions. While this dilution will support the pretence that the Festival is "non-political," it will also raise serious problems of maintaining Communist control over the proceedings. Furthermore, the Festival will be exposed in all likelihood to hostile criticism and even to attempted sabotage by anti-Communist elements, especially emigre groups.

Recently (Fall 1958) the initial self-assurance of the Festival organizers appears to have given way to moods of anxiety over the extensive opposition encountered from Austrian youth organizations, non-Communist political parties and the local press. There is no clear indication at this time, however, that the Communists will be sufficiently discouraged to pack up their tents and move to a Bloc site, the most logical of which would seem to be Prague. Nevertheless, the possibility of such a switch should not be ruled out. On balance it appears probable that the Communists will continue to count on the discipline and manipulative skill of their youth cadres to contain the Festival within acceptable limits even in the traditionally relaxed atmosphere of Vienna. Whether or not developments between now and July 1959 will vindicate the judgment of the Communist leaders, they are surely aware that they are assuming unprecedented risks.

The selection of a neutral Western country for the site of the Festival provides a counter-propaganda opportunity to the Free World which should not go unchallenged. It is the purpose of this paper, through an analysis of the Sixth Festival, to point toward a concerted course of action which might turn the Vienna Festival to our advantage.

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BETWEEN TWO COMMUNIST WORLD YOUTH FESTIVALS:
Moscow 1957 - Vienna 1959

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope and Cost of 1957 Festival

1. Contrived as a spectacular advertisement of the Kremlin leadership's "new look" of benign political tolerance and reasonableness, the Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students, through its endlessly repeated theme of universal "peace and friendship," was also designed to serve as a prototype for peaceful coexistence on a mass scale. It was, in fact, the largest international gathering ever held in Moscow and the first of its kind within the Soviet Union (all previous Festivals were held in satellite capitals). It provided fourteen event-packed days for 35, 000 delegates - more than half from outside the Soviet Bloc - for an additional estimated 70, 000-100, 000 youthful "guests" mostly from within the USSR, and for great crowds of enthralled Muscovites. In size and scope it surpassed even the epochal 40th Anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution, held in Moscow some three months later. According to an experienced Western observer, the latter event would have been a "mere anti-climax" to the Festival had it not been for the glamor of the Sputnik successes.

2. The 1957 youth fete was probably as impressive a success as its sponsors had hoped and as its Free World opponents had anticipated.¹ In evaluating its significance, we must recognize that the Festival was not an isolated event, designed to achieve a single impact. Like all major Communist undertakings, it must be envisaged as part of a political and propaganda continuum, a never-ending series of efforts conducted by the vast network of "International Fronts." The

¹ The prospects for the Moscow Festival were discussed in SRS-5, International Communism and Youth: The Challenge of the 1957 Moscow Festival, 6 June 1957.

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sponsoring organizations, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) play interacting roles with the other adult fronts, especially the World Peace Council (WPC) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Within this centrally directed framework, the Moscow Festival provided the impetus for a new series of regional and local follow-ups which exerted a stimulating effect on Communist organizations throughout the world, especially in the Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries.

3. The money, time, and effort expended on the Festival by the Soviet Government, by the two international Communist youth fronts and their affiliates were of a colossal order.¹ Estimates of the cost run between a minimum equivalent of 100 million and a maximum of 150 million US dollars.² The bulk of this sum was provided by the Soviet Union, with token funds raised by local contribution campaigns, lotteries, and other special events. The global organizing efforts for the Festival covered the better part of a year and involved varied and complicated operations and logistics. The assembling, transportation to, within and from the USSR; the housing, feeding (including the preparation and serving of a great variety of national dishes) and other care of thousands of young visitors from almost every part of the earth presented a man-

¹ The Italian Communist Party Organ L'Unita admitted the high cost of the Festival in a front-page story August 6, 1957, headlined: "The Festival Costs Many Millions of Rubles but Much less than a Single Day of War."

² Such estimates are necessarily somewhat impressionistic. They may not take account of the fact much of the outlay resulted in permanent improvements of the city, such as stadia, concert halls, and other buildings.

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agement problem of major proportions. Arrangements for the hundreds of daily cultural events, sports, entertainments and exhibitions were carried out with remarkable precision.

4. The massive publicity barrage for the Festival by Radio Moscow exceeded that for any event since Stalin's death, with the single exception of the 20th CPSU Congress (February 1956). During the period of the Festival, 56% of Moscow's broadcasts in all languages were devoted to the general meetings and other events, and to interviews with participants and the press. This was a much higher percentage than for previous Festivals. In all, some 1,966 extensive Soviet radio items were broadcast as compared with only 279 during the 1955 Warsaw Festival. Moscow's broadcasts were beamed worldwide. Foreign audiences heard, in addition to the more general coverage, detailed reports on the particular activities of their own delegations.

B. Propaganda Aims of the Festival

5. The major propaganda aims of the Communist sponsors of the Festival were:

a. To impart a benign "New Look" to the Soviet Union. The foremost propaganda objective was to impress the world with the new course of the Soviet leadership in the warmth of the post-Stalin "thaw," a movement away from dogmatic orthodoxy and intractability toward a seemingly benevolent political tolerance, objectivity, and "reasonableness" which would permit opposing views to be expressed even in the citadel of Communism itself. The creation of this impression was essential in making friends and influencing people, particularly in the vast uncommitted areas of the world. The unprecedented permission for thousands of young non-Communists to swarm over Moscow

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and give vent to "alien" opinions and ideas probably never heard before within the USSR would also serve as vivid demonstrations of the confident strength of Khrushchev and his associates.

b. To help recoup Soviet prestige among those youth of the non-Communist world, who in the past had been amenable to Communist influence but who had become disillusioned by the ruthless repression of Hungarian youth in the uprising of 1956. Ever-conscious of the role of youth, particularly students, in the development of World Communism, the Kremlin regarded the re-winning of the cadres of leftist youth groups in other countries, particularly under-developed areas, as a prime objective in its effort to stabilize the Communist movement, preparatory to new international initiatives.

c. To induce mass support of Soviet foreign policy by the youth of non-Communist countries, in particular of (1) "peace" and disarmament programs advantageous to the Soviet Union, and (2) the extension of Soviet influence in the main target areas, i. e. the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

d. To curb dissent, bolster the faith and spur the efforts of Soviet youth on behalf of the Party and the Soviet state. The intellectual ferment and resentment among a sizeable sector of youth within the USSR had given the Kremlin admitted cause for concern. The Soviet leadership hoped that by showing its ability to attract thousands of youth from Free World countries to Moscow, despite the unpleasantness in Hungary, and by permitting relatively free contacts and exchanges with them, it would impress Soviet youth with the wisdom and strength of the Party.

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II. SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE FESTIVAL

A. Size and Political Make-up of Delegations by Areas.

6. Estimates of the total number of youth and student delegates at the Moscow Festival are obtained from two sources: the "official" counts and estimates of the Festival managers, and the separate reports from Free World sources of the number going from each country. The figures from both sources are generally consistent as to the world total; about 35,000 attending delegates (as distinguished from "guests," many of whom were invited onlookers from within the USSR, totalling some 120,000). Approximately half of the delegates were from the 12 Soviet Bloc countries. There is some discrepancy in the figures for world areas and individual countries which, if added up, amount to more than the over-all total. Thus, in some of the figures cited below it is necessary to indicate maximum and minimum estimates.

7. West European and non-Bloc East European representation at the Festival totaled between 14,000 and 15,500. A discrepancy between this and the several country totals is attributed to the number of persons who at the last moment filled vacant slots in the original allocations, or who went to Moscow not from their home countries but from other countries where they were studying or traveling. The largest of the European delegations were: France (2,000), Italy, (1,900-2,300), Finland (1,600-2,000), Great Britain (1,650), West Germany (1,100-1,300) and Austria (1,000). In each instance these numbers were as great as, or greater than had been targeted by the Festival sponsors, as were those of most of the other European delegations. The Greek delegation was one of the most disappointing to the Festival planners. Only 80 Greek youth participated, compared to an original target of 2,000 and a later much revised estimate of 250. The Yugo-

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slav delegation, numbering about 200 as anticipated, was the first group from that country to attend a World Youth Festival since 1947.

8. The Middle Eastern delegates, especially sought after in the light of the Festival's propaganda objectives, numbered 2,300 to 2,800. They came from 18 countries and included a minimum of 1,500 Arabs. African representatives (all parts of the African continent) totaled 440 to 460 from 40 countries and territories. India sent 450-600, 250 of whom were students in Europe. Seventeen Far Eastern non-Communist countries sent a total of 520-660. Latin American delegates numbered 850-1,000 from 32 countries or regions. North American participants numbered 360, of whom 200 were from Canada and 160 from the United States.

The Soviet Bloc Delegates

9. The delegations from the Soviet Union and the satellites (17,000 total) were, as usual, representatives of the various official Communist youth and student organizations of their countries. However, perhaps because it played the role of host, the Soviet contingent appeared to be far less politically sectarian, more cordial, and often more open-minded than at other Festivals, although the regime issued several sharp warnings against too much camaraderie with Westerners. The Polish delegation (1,250) turned out to be one of the most pleasant surprises - from the Western point of view - of the entire proceedings. It was in many ways the liveliest, the most inquiring and searchingly critical of any Bloc group that has ever appeared at a Festival. The Czechs (1,200), Rumanians (1,000), East Germans (1,200) and other Eastern European satellite delegations were generally dutiful and quiescent, according to form. The Hungarians (over 1,000), largely young secret policemen and Kadar stooges, formed the most orthodox and puppet-like Communist delegation. The Chinese Communist delegates, estimated at about 3,000, were described by the Chinese Com-

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unist press as the largest and most representative group ever to go abroad from China.

Organizational and Professional Representation

Among other statistics cited by the sponsors, the following are of particular interest:

10. More than 22 international and over 1,000 national organizations (many of them "paper" groups) were represented, about half of which were not affiliated with WFDY and IUS. Some 4,150 athletes from 49 countries took part in the Third International Friendly Youth Games and some 2,000 from 40 countries in the Festival sports program. There were two separate series of athletic events held during the period of the Festival. About 2,000 newspapermen - according to Soviet claims - twice as many as expected, including 743 foreign correspondents (many of whom were from Bloc countries) representing 200 newspapers for 47 countries and all major news agencies, radio and television networks from all over the world - covered the events at the Festival. More than 7,000 representatives from all continents attended the 23 professional and trade meetings. More than 2,000 young artists from 47 countries took part in the International Art Exhibition in which 3,500 paintings and objets d'art were exhibited.

Political Make-up of Free World Delegations

11. The 1957 Festival had a far larger proportion of non-Communist official participants in attendance than had ever appeared before. This was undoubtedly the result of the special effort made by the sponsors to persuade youth groups in the Free World that this was to be an open, non-political event. Many young people who had not the slightest interest in Communism but who were curious to see Moscow, looking forward to a good time for two weeks at very small expense,

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decided to attend. In addition, some anti-Communists saw the first real chance ever offered at any international Communist youth gathering to carry out some effective counter-Communist propaganda. In the past, delegations to the Festivals had been overwhelmingly made up of young Communists or fellow travelers.

12. The Western European delegations contained a large number of non-Communists. British sources estimated that almost two-thirds, or over 1,000 of the 1,650 British delegates, had little or no sympathy for Communism. The French and Italian groups (about 2,000 each), representing the Western countries with the most powerful Communist Parties, included one-third to one-half non-Communists. The Italians were reported to be the most ill-behaved of the Free World delegates.¹ The West German delegation (I, 200) was heavily non-Communist, or certainly behaved as though it were. Its one mission appeared to be to undercut or at least to neutralize the Communist-dominated East German delegation. In the opening parade, when the East Germans appeared with a "Germania" banner, the West Germans did likewise; in general they gave their Communist co-nationals little opportunity to assert any claim that they were the "true" German representatives. It was reported that both of these delegations were quartered and dined together and that the West Germans succeeded in doing some effective propagandizing, while themselves remaining immune to Communist appeals.

13. The US participants (they refused to let themselves be described as "delegates,") who as discussed later became the focus of attention of the people of Moscow, num-

¹ The Italians were said to have refused to pay taxi fares, to have complained about food and service, and to have taken many items in their hotel rooms as "souvenirs."

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bered a mere 160. On their own initiative they had come to the Festival in spite of the strong official discouragement of the Department of State. The remarkable fact about them - in the light of the Communist domination of such groups in the past - was that not more than 20% were Communist-oriented, and even the greater part of those were reported to have acted like "good Americans" by the time the Festival ended. They had an effect on the Muscovites and the Soviet youth with whom they came in contact far in excess of their numerical strength and in spite of the lack of political sophistication of the large majority who were primarily interested in the opportunities for a good time.

14. The Middle Eastern delegations varied widely in their size, composition and attitudes toward the Festival. The Egyptians and other Arab delegations, the favored protégés of the Festival sponsors, received the most care and adulation in the parades and other big events, in their privileged housing and feeding, and in their leading positions on the various committees and sub-committees. In addition, they were provided with official Soviet Government sea transportation to and from the Festival. Estimates of the number of Egyptians who showed up at the Festival range between 550 and 663, including 150 girls, students at the University of Moscow, and several newspaper correspondents. The Syrians numbered 450-500, including a member of the Syrian parliament and ten news reporters. The delegation was led by a senior official of the Syrian Ministry of Education. On the other end of the scale, the Israeli contingent was composed of two delegations of about 100 representatives each, one Communist and the other non-Communist. Both were united in their loyalty to Israel and were equally discriminated against by the Soviet authorities. The Festival managers did almost everything conceivable to subordinate and block off, by obvious intent and by subterfuge, the activities of the Israelis in Moscow. Nevertheless the response of the Moscow Jewish community was so fervent in seeking out the young Israelis

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that the Soviet Festival leadership was taken aback and appeared not to know quite how to cope with the situation. The Iraqi and other Arab delegations, although courted by the Soviet sponsors, were offered fewer inducements and privileges than the Egyptian and Syrian groups, and their reaction to the Festival was less enthusiastic.

15. African delegations, also prime targets of the Festival planners, were the objects of about as much attention - and perhaps even more public curiosity - as the Arabs. Moscow propaganda featured the meetings, dances, tete-a-tetes, between African negroes and white delegates from all over the world. One humorous note for Westerners was the exhibition of black clothing dummies in the Moscow shops to demonstrate Communist racial "equality." The actual number of delegates from each African country or territory is difficult to ascertain. It is known that from several of the colonial African countries few if any delegates appeared, largely as a result of the local governmental restrictions placed upon them and the difficulties experienced by the Communists in reaching the kind of youth and students who would be "representative." Free World sources estimated that no more than 460 delegates came from the entire African continent. Nevertheless, the WFDY claimed officially that a "great number" of African representatives came to the Festival and that the "number of participants from Africa, Asia and Latin America is almost twice as big as that of previous Festivals!" The WFDY claim is inflated and probably overlooks the fact that a large part of the Afro-Asian delegations consisted of students who were studying in Europe (including the USSR).

16. The delegates from non-Communist Far Eastern countries numbered less than half the number anticipated by the Festival organizers. The regional target was between 1,950 and 2,000 but as previously indicated the estimate of actual attendance was 520-660. The largest

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Asian delegation was the Indonesian, totaling 200 (of whom about 50 were students in Europe) as against a Communist target of 190-350. The second largest was the Japanese delegation (155-260), one of the greatest disappointments to the Soviet sponsors who had made plans for 500. The Burmese representation was even worse from the Communist point of view, numbering only 12 as against an original target of 500 and the much lowered anticipation of 50. Actually Australia (110-150) and New Zealand (25-40) were the only countries in the area to send about as many delegates as had been anticipated.

17. The Latin American delegations, in the view of Western observers at the Festival, were generally more "unenthusiastic" than the delegates from other areas, excepting possibly the Middle East, and certainly more than those of Western Europe. In general the Central and South American representation included the largest proportions of Communists or Communist-sympathizers of any non-Bloc groups at the Festival, even though there were highly articulate critics of the Soviet Union among the delegates. The largest delegations from Latin America were Brazil with 225 members; Chile, 195; Argentina, 165; Mexico, 85; and Uruguay, 71. Total participation from all Latin American countries was claimed by the Festival sponsors to have numbered 958 or nearly twice the number who attended the Warsaw Festival in 1955.

B. The Physical Setting and Main Events

18. Advance notices of the preparations for the Festival indicated that the Soviet sponsors were so eager to put on an impressive show for the mass of expected delegates and visitors that they had transformed Moscow into a vast Potemkin village. As far as possible, the usually drab appearance of the Soviet capital was dressed up to look shiny and gay. But the façade thus created was not altogether false

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and temporary. It is true that the quickly-potted plants and hastily dug-in trees, and the thin veneer of new paint on some old landmarks did, in fact, provide a Potemkin touch. But much of the face-lifting of Moscow, and certainly the building of new stadia, concert halls and housing facilities and the removal of antique traffic bottlenecks were of a more solid and lasting character. Reports from correspondents and other observers indicated that the Moscow citizenry was quite enchanted not only with the gay and colorful festivities of 14 days, but with the cleaning up and modernizing of whole sections of the city, such as had never been seen before. Many Muscovites expressed the wish to visitors that the Youth Festival could be repeated every year.

19. To foreign visitors, particularly Westerners, however, the bare, drab and slummy spots showed through and exposed the generally unappealing aspects of the city. Yet even the most critical were willing to grant that an efficient job had been done in housing, feeding and transporting the delegates. The Americans reported that their quarters, although not the choicest - the best were saved for the Arab and African delegates - were adequate and compared not unfavorably with older college dormitory space in the United States. Bus transportation was frequent and free to all parts of the city and to all Festival events. Haircuts, laundry and cleaning were also free. Food was plentiful and adequately prepared with attention given to the preparation of national dishes, especially for the more exotic tastes of the Arabs, Africans and Orientals. Pocket money was provided many of the delegates.

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III. SOME SIGNIFICANT EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED HAPPENINGS

20. The organizing ability and painstaking care of the Communists in creating and engineering international political activities are nowhere more evident than in their planning and carrying out the world gatherings of their international front organizations. In the youth and student areas, the Festivals have always been notable, and the Sixth was, as the Communists intended it to be, "the greatest ever." As already noted, the programming and scheduling down to the last detail were a striking performance, even from the point of view of critical Westerners. However, what made this Festival distinctive in comparison to others was the proportion of happenings which were probably unexpected, or at least different than expected, by the Communist sponsors. The planned events illustrate the true political and propaganda nature of the Festival. Most of the unexpected events demonstrated the ways in which Free World youth on their own initiative were able to take advantage of the temporary lifting of the Iron Curtain to deliver some telling thrusts against Communist theory and practice.

A. The Ideological Overture to the "Non-Political" Festival

21. Behind the elaborate trappings, the ingratiating arrangements, lay the hard political realities. These were disclosed as early as the great opening session in Lenin Stadium, 28 July, at which 60,000 spectators were present and which followed the vast parade of all delegations to the Festival. At this ceremonial overture, virtually all the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party were present to give complete Party sanction to the proceedings. Led by Khrushchev and Voroshilov (who was the main speaker), the following mem-

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bers or candidate-members of the CPSU Presidium officiated: Belyayev, Brezhnev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Ignatov, Kirichenko, Kuusinen, Suslov, Furtseva, Khrushchev, Shvernik, Mukhiddinov, Pospelov, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Mzhavandze and Pervukhin. Moscow Radio in an international broadcast reported that these leaders were greeted by the crowd with "tempestuous and prolonged applause."

22. Voroshilov, on behalf of the Party and Soviet governmental hierarchy, made a fully orthodox Communist (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) ideological opening speech. After a formal note of welcome and the usual platitudes about the "contribution to . . . the cause of consolidating peace and friendship on earth . . .," and emphasizing that "we have never imposed nor are we going to impose our ideas or our views on anyone," Voroshilov concluded: "And if the great ideas of socialism triumph in the course of historic development and even more countries and peoples take the road of socialist development, that of course, is not a matter of propaganda. It is a law governing the historical development of society, for socialism is the most progressive social system, the one most suited to satisfy the needs and aspirations of the peoples"

B. The Vocational Meetings, Seminars and Special Get-togethers

23. Apart from the great parades, pageants, sports events, concerts and dances, much greater stress was laid in the 1957 Festival than in previous ones on the get-togethers of delegates on the basis of common vocational, hobby and intellectual interests. The vocation or "professional" meetings embraced a large number of trades and professions, including dockers, miners, journalists, builders, railroadmen, engineers, printers, teachers, salaried workers and other groups. Agendas were prepared in advance and a vast

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amount of pre-Festival literature was mailed out describing details of these meetings. Similarly, meetings of different hobbyists - stamp collectors, radio amateurs, hikers, photographers - were held. The number and variety of student seminars in 1957 exceeded that of any previous Festival. At the close, the International Committee stated that there had been 24 vocational and professional meetings, hundreds of meetings between delegations, numerous regional and national meetings, and 20 student seminars.

24. This battery of meetings represented the serious program of the Festival. In them the political and propaganda purposes of the Communist leaders were specifically but subtly developed. The vocational meetings provided the opportunity for influencing the younger people in the various arts, crafts and professions which are practiced in most countries.¹ These were part of a continuing program of the WFDY and IUS, followed up by a number of other vocational meetings organized during each year between the Festivals to tie the work of the youthful auxiliaries into that of the adult international fronts. The student seminars, organized by the IUS, are designed to appeal to the particular intellectual, economic and social interests of students as against those of youth generally, who are the province of WFDY. As one Soviet writer remarked: "Festival meetings have not been arranged solely to allow the delegates to embrace one another, exchange badges, and sing songs and dance. They are arranged so that they can talk things over soberly, debate and discuss problems."

¹ The elders in the various vocational fields are approached through the various specialized Communist front organizations such as those covering scientific workers, lawyers, doctors, journalists, skilled and unskilled labor.

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25. At past Festivals and other international youth group meetings, the Communist propaganda content and tactics had often been obvious and heavy-handed. At the 1957 Festival there was a much greater appearance of objective discussion. In several instances, since more non-Communists had come to the Festival than had probably been anticipated, there were some surprisingly forthright exchanges of views. In a number of notable instances the Soviet positions on an issue were openly attacked by Free World delegates. To this extent the Soviet sponsors exposed their youth to the "contamination" of non-Communist ideas. Having declared that these meetings were "open to all" regardless of political orientation, the Communists often found themselves faced by embarrassingly strong counter-arguments. In such cases they had to marshal their forces quickly so as to prevent the dissemination of facts and ideas which might become subversive to the Communist cause. Two examples of such meetings were the Philosophy Seminar and the Economic Seminar.

The Philosophy Seminar

26. This seminar, held at Moscow University, was attended by 500 delegates and was presided over by the Secretary of the Festival Preparatory Committee, an indication of the importance of the event. Advance copies of the lecture by T. I. Oyberman, Moscow University Professor of Philosophy, were handed out, together with propaganda pamphlets presenting the Soviet line on Hungary. The introductory speaker was another Soviet professor who summarized the main speaker's thesis that the development of human society is based on scientific laws and can accordingly be predicted. Professor Oyberman then summarized his opus orally.

27. In the morning session, anti-Marxist speakers predominated and were applauded spontaneously by the audience, a majority of which seemed to be non-Marxist. The Communists apparently went into a huddle during the noon recess, for the temper of the afternoon session was decidedly different.

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Communist speakers heavily outnumbered non-Communists - only a West German and a Pole held forth against ten pro-Communist speakers. The latter also dropped their intellectual or pseudo-intellectual armor in favor of highly-charged emotional appeals aimed principally at the non-European audience. The Communists were well-dispersed in the audience and used the organized-claque method of applauding the demagogic utterances of party-line speakers and of showing disapproval of opposition speakers.

28. Of the apparently anti-Communist speakers, the most effective were two Poles, an East German professor, an Italian and a West German. A non-Communist speaker from the Cameroons served to belie the appearance of monolithic Afro-Asian solidarity with the Soviets. The East German speaker provided the greatest surprise, even though his heretical views were properly coated with Marxian sugar. The Poles were the best prepared and in their quiet way the most dangerous to the Communists. One of the Poles argued that the questions posed by Professor Oyberman demanded certain set answers, which was not a proper philosophical approach. After six straight party line speakers had all but turned the "seminar" into an apparent Communist propaganda victory, one of the Poles had the temerity to challenge the validity of Marxism itself as the basis for interpreting events. According to an official Western report the Pole stated:

The theory of Marx is inadequate because it does not indicate how one can tell which theory, which prediction, is really proletarian. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, for example, claim to be Marxist, but who can deny that contradictions exist between them. In the past, it sufficed to call any theory bourgeois in order to preclude discussion. If a new theory was to be introduced, it was labeled proletarian and had to be accepted by them as sci-

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tific theory. After the war, the accepted theory was that an economic collapse would occur in the West, but this did not happen. Some people say that only their theory is scientific but this is not true. Science consists of the interaction of many conflicting theories. . . . In a creative discussion, the scientific truth (or lack of truth) of a statement would be determined on the basis of objective scientific examination. Dogmatic, literal interpretation of Marxism cannot be valid. Marxism may remain valid for the future if it is taken as a general undogmatic approach, but not otherwise.

The Economics Seminar

29. During the International Seminar for students of Economics, a British delegate told Communist participants that their use of the word "capitalism" was completely emotional. He said that they judge British public opinion by such papers as the Daily Worker, whose readers represent only one-half of one percent of the British population. The delegate went on to discuss the merits of the British economic system, which he termed "dynamic." Britain, he said, had found a happy mean between the power of the state and the individual.

30. Another speaker, a French delegate, deplored the tendency to emphasize only the negative aspects of "colonialism." He pointed out that colonial powers had contributed a great deal in laying the foundations for further advance in underdeveloped countries. Both the British and French delegates were applauded by the seminar participants.

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C. The U.S. Participants - Surprise of the Festival

31. About 160 Americans (ages late teens to late 20's) arrived in Moscow for the Festival, despite official discouragement by the Department of State. The Department's policy had been based on the position that the event was patently a Communist propaganda show and that the presence of young Americans would tend to lend dignity to the occasion and would be exploited by the Communists as evidence of tacit US approval of the Festival. This, it was felt, would be undesirable, particularly after the recent violent suppression of youth in Hungary. It was not foreseen at the time that the propaganda intent of the Soviet sponsors would backfire in two important respects: (a) that Soviet youth and large sections of the Moscow public would be exposed to facts and truths about the US and the West which they had not known before, and (b) that the discussion and contacts with the Americans would disclose in the full glare of world publicity some of the genuine doubts and questionings of Soviet youth.

32. The American group was not trapped into having itself labeled as a "delegation." The Festival managers wanted the group to carry a banner in the big stadium parade reading "US Delegation for Peace and Friendship," but the majority insisted that the banner should read "US Participants Salute World Youth." Aside from being definitely "unofficial," the small American representation was also largely unorganized, leaderless, unbrieled and unoriented. As noted previously, despite the fact that the preparations for the Festival were under Communist-front auspices, knowledgeable observers estimated that no more than 15% of those who arrived in Moscow were young Communists or sympathizers. The remaining 85% were non-Communist and some were militantly anti-Communist. They came from varied backgrounds, and from widely diverse educational and social levels. Most of

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them admittedly went for the sheer curiosity of seeing the famed capital of the "major enemy" and for the fun provided by the vast carnival of parades, dances, sports shows, concerts, and exhibitions, not the least aspect of which was the opportunity of meeting and observing young people from strange and exotic lands. This large majority were as politically unsophisticated and as unaware of the subtleties of Communist propaganda as most people of their age who have not paid particular attention to the world ideological conflict or who have not been especially briefed on the subject.

33. There were, however, a few - perhaps a dozen or more - who had chosen to go to Moscow for more serious purposes. Among these were graduate students of Soviet affairs and Russian language, of history, political science and economics, and some who were interested in music, fine arts and other cultural aspects of the USSR. It was this handful of advanced students and observers who, on a voluntary and individual basis, took advantage of every opportunity to present effectively and directly to Soviet audiences the Free World and the US point of view on a host of previously "forbidden" issues. They also observed and reported publicly for the benefit of Free World readers many significant discussions with Russian students and other Soviet young people.

34. The extent and variety of the many unexpected experiences of the undirected American participants may be illustrated by the following:

a. They had no trouble in meeting and talking to large numbers of the "men-in-the-street" in Moscow. In fact, most of them wherever they went were the objects of special attention and at times were engulfed by crowds of eager, curious and friendly Muscovites of all ages. Usually the conver-

¹ See Appendix for most frequent questions and typical replies..

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sations would begin with two or three questioners, with more and more people joining in until large gatherings had assembled. The type of questions and of responses are illustrated in an appendix to this study.

b. The more knowledgeable of the American visitors made a special point, whenever opportunity offered, of communicating to the listeners the content and sometimes the specific language of the report of the UN Committee on Hungary. This condemnation of the Soviet Union was previously unknown to the listeners, since communications relaying the Report had been jammed or censored. In one dramatic instance an American graduate student who ventured into Red Square on the rainy first night of the Festival was buttonholed by curious Soviet youths and asked a number of rapid-fire questions. When he began to read the UN report the crowd grew to about a thousand. "We began to block traffic in Red Square," he reported, "and the police moved us on, so I went over to the Lenin Mausoleum and began talking to the crowd below. At least a thousand people were there and I had four or five volunteer interpreters from the crowd going at once. People would rush up with coats to protect me from the rain. I talked for hours. They disputed many of the things I said about Hungary but at the same time they wanted to hear more and more. They wanted to listen to what I had to say. This was really the beginning. We suddenly realized how important this was and how much we could really accomplish by such conversations. How anxious, how incredibly, insatiably curious the Soviet citizens were, how desirous to talk to Americans to find out all there was to know about the outside world!"

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c. On another occasion the Moscow crowd kept the speaker talking until about 2:00 AM. When the gathering broke up, the American found that since all streetcars and buses had stopped running, the only way he could get to his quarters (some miles away from the center of Moscow) was by taxi. He discovered that he had no money with him. When the lingering crowd learned of this, they "passed the hat" and collected more than enough rubles to pay his fare home!

d. Similar responses were experienced by other American students in Red Square, at Moscow University, and in other parts of the city. On several occasions they were heckled by young party activists but these in turn were told in more than one instance by others in the audience to "shut up, we want to hear what he has to say." The only police interference they encountered (and the Moscow police was out in full force to maintain order during the Festival) was when the crowds caused traffic jams, as in the case mentioned previously, and the Americans were merely told to move along to some other less crowded spot. In one case a tired policeman in the late evening stood patiently by and asked "Don't you Americans ever get tired of talking? I'm working over-time and want to get home."

e. Various US visitors were approached by informal groups of Moscow University students for discussions on many important issues, in particular those concerned with controversies in the field of literature,¹ the fine arts, and music.

¹The Americans reported that the Soviet students of American literature knew only a relatively few American

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35. As against the tangible success of the informed young Americans in "getting through" to the Soviet youth and general public either by speeches or by answering questions, the Soviet authorities made many quite obvious attempts to exploit the presence of the Americans for their own purposes. These took the form of planted radio and press interviews with the few American participants who were pro-Communist or with those who were especially naive in their reactions to the doings in Moscow, and of sharp denunciations of statements by non-Communists. Likewise, small or trivial incidents were exaggerated to "show up" the contrary Americans.

36. Examples of the arranged interviews were:

a. Several broadcasts from Radio Moscow for home consumption, for broadcast in English to North America and, selectively, in other languages to other countries quoting American participants as being "impressed" with the Festival and with Moscow, thanking their hosts for the privilege of being present and repeating the need for "peace and friendship"; one 19-year-old American student was quoted as describing Khrushchev as "fatherly."

b. Special broadcasts on pin-pointed subjects such as "US Youth says USSR Right on Hungary" and excerpts from the speech of an American participant in the Hiroshima Day rally, in which the American was quoted as saying "we readily join with all the youth of the world who denounce all the horrors of war" and who argue in favor of the elimination of atomic weapons.

authors. Among those mentioned several times were Mark Twain, Jack London, Dreiser, Hemingway, Steinbeck and Howard Fast. The latter had been extolled to the students as a great American "proletarian" writer. The Soviet listeners were apparently amazed to find out that Fast had parted company recently with the Communist Party, USA.

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c. Great radio and press play was given the incident of a young theological student with a camera who, attempting to short-cut his way to a Festival gathering, climbed over a factory fence and walked across the factory grounds. He was arrested and detained for several hours by the Soviet security police. In a broadcast of August 10, Moscow Radio gave a lengthy account of the incident, alleging that the young "priest" had taken pictures of a "plant working for defense" and quoting him as saying that he had taken the photographs at the behest of the "consular Section of the American Embassy."

37. Other Soviet broadcasts and press stories announced that "US Press Admits the Youth Rally a Success" and quoted liberally from a number of prominent American newspaper and news services. They did not fail, however, to denounce certain American correspondents (including Mr. Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System) for "distorting" the news about the Festival and they claimed that the Americans participating in the Festival were "annoyed" by ways in which activities were treated by the American correspondents.

38. The concern of the Communist leaders over the disturbing influences brought into the Festival by the Americans and others from capitalist countries was vividly demonstrated by the statement of Alexander N. Shelepin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (Young Communist League). Writing in Komsomolskaya Pravda after the closing of the Festival on August 17, Shelepin said:

The task of Komsomol organizations, of all leading Komsomol organs is now in an organized manner to assess the results of the festival, to examine what was good and what was bad, thoroughly to analyze

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everything that took place at the Festival and to draw the proper conclusions. We must be critical of what we saw at the Festival for we cannot agree with and fully accept what some delegations from the capitalist countries showed at the festival. Komsomol organizations must in the future also struggle against the penetration into our midst of an ideology, morals and habits that are alien to us . . .

Summary of the Soviet Public Reactions to the Americans.

39. A wide variety of reports indicates that the reaction of the Moscow public to the American delegation must have given the Soviet authorities considerable grounds for concern.

a. The citizens of Moscow and the youth of the city appeared completely genuine in the warmth of the welcome which they gave the Americans. While this cordiality was extended to other Western delegations (notably the British) and while there was probably greater curiosity concerning the more exotic delegations from Asia and Africa, the Americans seemed to be the focus of the greatest interest. This may be attributable primarily to the fact that these were the youth from "the other great power," the great - and envied - rival of the Soviet Union, the major target of incessant hostile Communist propaganda. The Muscovites visibly enjoyed the Americans and appeared to admire their frankness even when some of the visitors made statements highly critical of the Soviet regime. They wanted to be "liked" and respected by the Americans, and many times expressed the wish that more Americans had come to the Festival.

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b. Soviet University students were searchingly curious about the United States, culturally and economically as well as politically. By and large they were deeply ignorant of this country, reflecting the biased teaching and information they have received about it; but they showed an eager desire to learn more of the fact and realities about the United States, its way of life, its outlook and its policies.

c. On a more superficial level, many young Russians appeared enthusiastic about the "gayer" aspects of American life, in particular American jazz and other popular music. All Soviet listeners were pleased when an American spoke Russian, even poorly. There were very few evidences of animosity and a great manifestation of personal friendliness toward Americans in general.

The China Visit of the US Participants

40. One of the largely unanticipated results of the American group's participation in the Festival was the invitation extended by the Chinese delegation on August 9 to all the Americans present to visit Communist China. Free transportation with all expenses paid for 15 Americans was part of the offer; others were asked to pay a token of \$100.00 each.

41. The invitation caused a bitter rift among the American visitors to Moscow. They were well aware of the policy of their government toward the travel of any US citizens to Communist China and the invalidity of their passports for such a tour. Reports from participants indicate that the 160 Americans debated the proposition all night. The official position was re-emphasized by the American Embassy in Moscow when one young American delegate on August 10 reported to it the nature and circumstances of the offer. Nevertheless, 41 of the 160 Americans present in Moscow chose to go despite

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the disapproval of their government. Reports indicate that virtually all of those known to be pro-Communist (about 25) were among those who elected to go. Thus more than half of the delegation to China were presumably favorably disposed toward the regime of the country they were visiting. The rest were merely curious and gripped by a sense of adventure in the presence of an opportunity to see the legendary and forbidden Communist China at first hand (and at small cost). Several amateur photographers and professional news correspondents saw a rare opportunity to make names for themselves and earn money. A number actually did obtain assignments from newspapers, wire services, magazines, or television networks, but two or three were expelled from China on the grounds of improper activities.

42. Aside from a dozen or so "impartial," non-politically oriented tourists, the group which went to China included some three or four militant anti-Communists who were motivated by the idea that they could help to offset the pro-Communist or "leftish" majority by rendering an objective report of the visit. Two of these walked out on the delegation, as a sign of protest before the group's tour was completed. These and a number of other members of the group were interviewed by Free World press representatives after they left China (two of them exited at Hong Kong) and after they got home. The Communist press and radio, both Chinese and Soviet, as might be expected, played up the activities of the group to support Sino-Soviet Bloc propaganda lines.

43. Among the highlights of these interviews may be mentioned:

a. The group's itinerary included Peiping, Changchun, Dairen, Tientsin, Wuhan, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, and back to Peiping. All travel was by train except for a boat trip from Wuhan to Nanking. Altogether the group covered 7,500 miles and stayed in China six weeks.

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b. The whole trip was a conducted "Cook's Tour," although the Americans were given the impression at the start they could "see anything they wanted." In fact, they saw a great variety of cities, towns, and villages; they talked to hundreds of workers, farmers, students, intellectuals, and the allegedly "richest capitalists" in the country who gave parties for them. They visited many Chinese industries including steel, auto, textile and silk factories.

c. The entire group had an interview with Chou En-lai. They asked many questions and received what purported to be "frank" answers, coupled with some obvious "brain-washing" propaganda. All the Americans who reported this interview felt that Chou was "smooth" and would be most persuasive to the naive or to those who know nothing about the background of the Chinese Communist regime.

d. They received a "warm welcome" wherever they went but it was not comparable to that given by the Muscovites.

e. The pro-Communists regarded the living conditions of the people and industrial progress as "much higher than you might expect"; the non-Communists as generally "no worse than was expected." All agreed that there was no comparison with the standard of living in the West.

f. From the point of view of the Chinese Communists, the tour was a fairly effective propaganda show, although the consensus appeared to be that no new "converts" were made. Thus, those already oriented in favor of Communist China may have been confirmed in their views but those unfavorable to it did not have their basic opinions changed.

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g. Non-Communists agreed that greater efforts should be made by the Free World to reach and to influence the students and other young intellectuals of Communist China. Some believed that the educated young Chinese are more amenable to values and concepts of political and social freedom than their Russian counterparts who have been under a Communist regime for a much longer period, although there were others who were ready to dispute this view.

Cooperation Among Non-Communist English Speaking Participants.

44. The non-Communist American participants at the Moscow Festival found ready and friendly collaboration not only from their fellow North Americans, the Canadians, but from the large British delegation and to some extent from the Australians and the New Zealanders. Without advance preparation, these unregenerated youth, who enjoyed a common bond of language and traditions of free speech and debate, formed a tacit and useful alliance. They lent moral and vocal support to each other in the large public meetings and, wherever opportunity offered, in the smaller get-togethers and seminars. There was general agreement among these participants that far more effective results could have been achieved if collaboration among the non-Communists in all Free World delegations had been planned and organized in advance.

45. The British delegation, 1,650 strong, was one of the largest and seemingly the most articulate Western group at the Festival. British reports indicate that more than a thousand were neither Communists nor fellow-travelers. Of these a large number were university graduate students, instructors, and other mature young intellectuals, and as many as 50 or 60 were especially well-briefed on the Soviet Union, on International Communism, and on the intent and program of the Festival. These and other British visitors

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demonstrated that they could debate effectively with Soviet speakers at pre-arranged meetings, and with questioners and hecklers in the Moscow crowds. At the close of the Festival the leader of the British delegation expressed the view that

. . . while it is recognized that the Government must condemn the Youth Festivals . . . (it is hoped) that if there is another . . . their expressions of condemnation will be framed in a way calculated to have a less discouraging effect on non-Communists who wish to go, and that the organization of parties of briefed individuals will be carried out on a bigger scale and more comprehensively . . .

D. The Intrepid Polish Delegation: Effective Critics of the Kremlin Orthodoxy

46. The large Polish delegation (1, 250 members) was the surprise of the youth rally on the Bloc side. It was well led, well organized, and highly articulate. It had been expected that the Poles, reflecting the relative liberalization which followed the events of the Fall of 1956, would be less rigid and orthodox toward the Party line set for the Festival; but it was not anticipated that they would so openly and deftly thwart the immediate intent of the Soviet sponsors, nor that they would so repeatedly "needle" their hosts.

47. Among other manifestations of independence, the Poles showed continual friendliness to the Americans whenever they met. They arranged for a joint meeting of the US, British, Canadian and Polish delegations on August 10, which the Americans attended in force. The Russian interpreters assigned to this - and indeed all - interdelegation meetings repeatedly tried to break up conversations between the Poles and the Westerners, particularly the Americans; but apparently much friendly and informative conversation got through.

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48. The United States Information Agency reported¹ that the Polish press wrote extensively on the subject of ideological discussions between the Polish youth delegation and the Russians. One article frankly noted: "The discussion was ardent and sharp." One meeting between Polish delegates and the representatives of the new French "left-wing" People's Movement was devoted to a discussion of workers' councils and trade unions in Poland. This discussion proved difficult to control, and Polish reporters indicated that whenever the current political situation in Poland was debated, the Poles were usually challenged not only by the Russians but also by other Bloc participants.

49. Polish and Soviet Writers Meet - The USIA also commented on the fact that among the Polish delegates were a number of young writers, who were invited to an informal meeting of the Soviet Writers' Club under the chairmanship of its secretary, S. Surkov. The meeting, despite the friendly informality stressed by the hosts, revealed a deep ideological cleavage, rendered all the more striking by the fact that the two groups represented two generations. The Poles were in their 20's; the Russians mostly belonged to an older, middle-aged group. The latter evidently expected that their guests would follow the Party line in spite of recent articles which had been published in the Polish press indicating disillusionment with Communism.

50. The following points emerged at the meeting:

- a. The rift existing between the Poles and the Russians was recognized by both camps.
- b. The Russians voiced vigorous objection to Polish assertions that no creative literary work

¹ "Communist Media Developments," 30 August 1957.

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had emerged from the Soviet Union during the 23 years since the Soviet Writers' Congress in 1934.

c. The Soviet writers tried to defend the theory that Socialist realism as a base for literary work was fully compatible with free development of creative writing.

d. The Russians accused some of the Poles of having nothing in common with Marxism.

e. One of the Polish delegates said plainly that in his opinion the theory of class struggle is incompatible with full freedom of artistic creation.

f. The Poles and the Soviets disagreed on the analysis of the works of Gorki.

51. The meeting ended on a note of apparent reconciliation introduced by the Soviet writers. The leader of the Soviet delegation expressed his approval of the discussion and its frank nature. Similar exchanges of views, if started earlier, he declared, could have avoided misunderstanding between the Poles and their Soviet colleagues.

52. Surkov wound up the proceedings with the announcement that he intends to write a book on the recent events in Poland. Yet, in spite of the conciliatory tone of his remarks, the observers of the meeting reported that both the Poles and the Russians left with a feeling of embitterment. It was difficult, if not impossible, to find a common ground between the young Poles, who were enjoying a period of political and cultural liberalization at home, and the old-time Communists who accepted the rigidity of the Party line in literature as a matter of fact. The Poles invoked Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of "a hundred flowers" in building their case.

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53. The activities and attitude of the Polish delegation seem to have evoked a responsive chord among some of the other satellites. The Czech monthly Kveten in its post-Festival issue (October 1957) carried a 3,000-word article by Jiri Sotola reviewing the artistic performances of Czechoslovaks and others. Commenting on the contribution of Polish youth to literary discussions during the Festival, Sotola observed:

They did not always speak cleverly, but their passionate defense of and propaganda for the young and younger Polish writers such as Roszewicz, Hlasek, Drozdowski, Bialoszewski and Harasymovicz not only was sincere and won sympathy but also was evidence of the fact that young Polish writers are well known in their country (at least among students) and that they have many ardent defenders.

54. The Soviet press and radio either did not report the controversies involving the Poles or, if it did, passed them off as examples of "true freedom" and inter~~change~~ change of ideas at the Festival. After the Festival, however, when the "thaw" began to give way to a new intellectual freeze, Soviet journals leveled attacks on Polish writers in various fields, alleging "unhealthy tendencies" and "revisionist" influence. Although much of the propaganda against the Polish revisionists seemed intended to press them to mend their ways, it also appeared designed to counteract the attraction of Polish views for those Soviet intellectuals who were aspiring toward greater freedom in their respective fields. For example, the Soviet philosophical journal Questions of Philosophy in an article entitled "Is this Marxism?" offered an elaborate criticism of Polish views in the fields of philosophy and natural and social science.

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55. On October 3, Moscow broadcast in Polish a Komsomolskaya Pravda article by Kudryavtsev attacking the Polish writer Slominski for throwing "a whole bucket of dirt" on Soviet literature and art while on a visit to Japan. Along with implied warnings to Soviet intellectuals not to imitate the Poles, Pravda and Moscow radio gave renewed publicity to the intensified Chinese drive against "rightists," the sequel to Mao Tse-tung's "contending schools" policy. This publicity was probably intended to discourage Soviet intellectuals who were looking upon Mao's doctrine as a counter to the regime's demands for strict adherence to orthodoxy.

E. The Hungarian Delegation: Most Puppet-Like at the Festival.

56. In sharp contrast to the Polish delegation, that of the new repressive Kadar regime of Hungary appears to have been composed largely of young security policemen and hard-core young Communists. By all accounts, it was the most obedient and orthodox of any group at the Festival, including the Soviet delegation itself. The Hungarians were highly organized and had been intensively briefed for two weeks before leaving for Moscow. They were equipped with literally truckloads of printed propaganda upholding the new regime and the Soviet intervention at the time of the uprising, and denouncing the "Fascist counter-revolutionaries."

57. The Hungarian Party daily Nepszabadsag on July 23 indicated that the delegation of 1,100 members was well prepared for any difficulties which might arise during the Festival. The Party paper reported that a "dress rehearsal" was held in Budapest before their departure and that the members were in a camp for five days "where they were informed about the detailed program of the great event." It added that "the Hungarian youth prepared themselves also politically for the Festival since already the delegations of 50 countries have

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expressed their desire to meet the members of the Hungarian delegation." The article also mentioned that:

The delegation will take to Moscow 22-1/2 tons of information pamphlets in view of the great interest expected. Not only do the members of the delegation want to tell people what happened in our country in October of last year, but also with the help of books in many languages, they want to show the truth about the counter-revolution and how we continue to build the country after the great shock.

58. On August 6, a pre-arranged meeting was held with the American participants. According to reports from Americans, the Hungarians engaged in a "filibuster" which was intended to prevent the Americans from voicing any opinions in favor of the young Hungarians - students and workers - who had led the revolt against the regime and been so bloodily suppressed. The Hungarian delegates handed out large numbers of pamphlets and pictures of the "atrocities" committed by the rebels, in particular pictures taken from LIFE magazine, showing the shooting of AVH (secret police) members by the rebels. Two of these AVH men, who claimed to have "miraculously" recovered from their wounds, were paraded as the heroes of the Hungarian delegation. The Americans present at the meeting became so disgusted with the "offensive" propaganda and manners of the Hungarians that they walked out in protest. Had the Americans been prepared and skilled in debate, they probably could have held their own much better against the carefully indoctrinated Hungarians.

F. The Israeli Delegation: Jewish Solidarity Spotlights Dilemma of Soviet Hosts.

59. Of the two Israeli delegations of about 100 members each, one was definitely Communist sponsored. The other was equally clearly non-Communist and was com-

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posed of nationalistic, Zionist youth organization representatives. This situation presented two dilemmas for the Soviet authorities: First, in view of the intensive propaganda effort being made by the Soviet sponsors to show special favor to the Arab delegations, the presence of any Israeli representatives offered a ticklish problem, particularly in such matters as the place and status of the Israelis in parades and other big events, and housing and feeding arrangements. Too much cordiality shown the Israelis might offset the red-carpet treatment which was reserved for the Arabs. Second, while it might be relatively easy to control a Communist delegation or even a mixed political group in which the Communists could play a leading role, it would be difficult if not impossible to keep a strong non-Communist delegation in line. To suppress it, on the other hand, would be to negate the propaganda boast of the sponsors that the Festival was intended to be truly open to all regardless of their political, racial and religious nature.

60. The welcome accorded the Israeli delegates by their co-religionists surpassed probably anything anticipated by the Soviet leaders and caused them to take stringent measures which served to expose their hand far more than they probably desired. Although the Communist press of other countries (L'Unità in Italy, L'Humanité in France, The Daily Worker in the USA, and others) reported that in the great parades Arab and Israeli marched "arm in arm," the Soviet press kept silent on the subject; and well it might, for the Israeli reported that they were at all times kept away from the Arab youth and rigidly segregated in their housing and feeding arrangements.

Fervent Response of Moscow Jews

61. On the other hand, wherever they went the Israelis were besieged by fervent Soviet Jews who wanted to know the facts about Israel and Jewish culture and progress. Many of them asked if they could be helped to emigrate to the

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"homeland." Eyewitness reports state that there were emotional scenes on the Moscow streets and that spontaneous demonstrations occurred repeatedly. "From dawn till well after midnight," a first-hand report from British sources states:

. . . groups of Jews crowded around the living quarters of the Israeli delegation although it was far out of town, at the 'Timiriazev Academy'. It was a virtual siege and every young Israeli leaving the building was immediately surrounded by throngs of Jewish youth, with innumerable questions about Israel. The same performance repeated itself again and again in the streets of Moscow. The peak of this experience was reached when the Israeli delegation visited the Moscow Synagogue. Many of its members were asked to read the weekly portion from the Bible, and the thousands of worshippers, with tears of joy in their eyes, gave vent to their emotions and expression of happiness which overwhelmed them at the sight of these young men, who came to them from the Jewish state, and at the sound of their Hebrew as a living language . . .

62. Another report published in the London Observer on August 9, 1957, stated that:

At the first Israeli concert of the Festival, performers and listeners alike broke into tears over the music, and afterwards the applauding audience refused to disperse. It ended with a triumphal march around the hall with the Israeli flag in the lead. It is clear that it took only the general license permitted during the Festival and the presence of genuine Israeli representatives to unleash that deep-rooted nationalist sentiment simmering just beneath the surface of Soviet Jewry.

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Soviet Countermeasures

63. Apparently fearing the spread of the "Zionist danger," the Soviet authorities during the second week of the Festival took a number of measures to minimize or neutralize the effect of the presence of the Israelis. These included:

- a. Last minute shifting of scheduled performances to out-of-the-way places;
- b. Arbitrary issuance of tickets to cultural events where the Israeli delegation were likely to appear;
- c. Assignment of extra contingents of police to control crowds which gathered around the delegation;
- d. A request to the delegation to stop distributing information pamphlets on the ground that they constituted "Zionist propaganda";
- e. Deceptive measures to conceal the time of departure of the Israeli delegation and police control at the railway station to avoid any demonstrations. At the end of the Festival, all the Israeli delegates were hurriedly shepherded out of the country. They were placed aboard "sealed" trains in the middle of the night at isolated stations. It is reported that somehow, even here, a sizeable crowd of Moscow Jews showed up to bid them farewell.

Some Significant Afro-Asian Delegations

64. The Egyptians and Syrians: The Favored Become Troublesome. As was anticipated, the intensified Soviet drive - both political and economic - to achieve greater influence in Egypt and Syria led to the delegations from

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those countries being both the largest and the most specifically privileged of any from the Middle East and Africa. The Egyptian representation is estimated, according to various reports, to have been between a minimum of 550 and a maximum of 663, including 21 Egyptian students at Moscow University. Fifteen Egyptian correspondents covered the Festival. The Syrians numbered between 450 and 500. Ten Syrian correspondents accompanied the delegation. According to reports from observers of various nationalities the Egyptians and Syrians were:

- a. Transported to and from the Festival in Soviet ships (at least 8 in number) and provided with all accommodations free of charge while they were in Moscow.
- b. Given favored and spotlighted positions in the parades and major Festival events.
- c. Placed in positions of leadership and prominence in many committees and organized activities of the Festival.
- d. Given especially prominent notice in the Soviet press and broadcasts.
- e. Given "red-carpet" treatment in housing, feeding, entertainment.

Generally speaking, most non-Communist observers at the Festival were of the opinion that the majority of the Egyptians and Syrians appeared thoroughly taken in by the Soviet flattery and, among all the groups, were the most ardent and infatuated in their emotional pro-Soviet reactions.

65. However, a number of reports indicate that there were sour notes even within this Communist-induced harmony. Thus, the Egyptians embarrassed their Soviet hosts

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at the start of the Festival by carrying a huge picture of Nas-
ser in the big parade in the Lenin Stadium. According to the
practice dictated by the Communist sponsors of previous Festi-
vals, national delegations were not supposed to feature the
names or pictures of their leaders unless they were Commu-
nists, and even these were proscribed at the Sixth Festival in
order to maintain the non-political illusion. The Egyptians
also were reported to have acted like precocious and spoiled
children, demanding favors, and complaining repeatedly. One
of the leaders of the group protested because he had to share
a room with two other members of the group and also objected
because the hotel to which he was assigned was "primitive and
not very clean."

66. Indications of more serious criticism of the
Soviet Union were reported by one of the Egyptian delegates
after he left Moscow. He was of the opinion that the propa-
ganda effects of the Festival were considerably offset because
of the dismal living conditions which were so evident in Moscow.
He felt that Egypt, although a very poor country, had achieved
a generally higher standard of living than the "mighty" social-
ist state. He attributed this backwardness primarily to the lack
of "liberty" in the USSR. He further commented that many vis-
itors to the Festival sold their clothing in the black market
before they left, even shabby clothes bringing high prices; that
the people of Moscow were truly hospitable and that he could
not understand how the Soviet people could continue to endure
their poor economic conditions. Noting that Communism is
illegal in Egypt he wrote home after leaving the Soviet Union
that Communists now in prison should be released and deport-
ed to Moscow. How much this delegate's views reflect those
of others in the Egyptian delegation has not been ascertained,
but he implied that a goodly number shared his opinion. A re-
port from another source indicated that the Egyptian delegates
expressed mass dissatisfaction with the conditions and accom-
modations on the Soviet ships which took them home.

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67. The Iraqi: Young Communists Defy their Government's Ban. The Iraq government, conscious of the fact that plans for sending delegates to the Festival were under the direction of the local Communist Party, prohibited its youth from attending. Nevertheless, a considerable number of Iraqi appeared. Observer estimates vary as to the actual number, ranging from 35 to 130; the Festival sponsors claimed 165. Perhaps the most reliable report was contained in a Baghdad broadcast of September 9, 1957, which stated that the Iraqi security authorities had revealed that the Soviet Embassy in Damascus had recently furnished visas to 98 persons who went to the Soviet Union from Iraq via Syria and that the Embassy had arranged for the Russian ship "Azaria" to take them to the USSR via Latakia. The broadcast stated that 17 of this group had been arrested upon their return to Iraq.

68. According to observers, the Iraqi delegation was predominantly made up of young Communists or pro-Communists. They did not distinguish themselves particularly at the Festival but served to strengthen the numerous Arab and "anti-colonialist" gatherings. According to the Arab News Agency, the Iraqi government felt strongly enough about the flouting of its prohibition against attendance to try 12 of the delegates before the Baghdad Criminal Court on October 19. The Court gave them sentences ranging from fines of 200 dinars to a year's imprisonment. Three of them had confessed that they went to Moscow with the aid of the Soviet Embassy in Damascus. Five others accused were discharged for lack of evidence. On October 26 the head of the Iraqi delegation and three other members were arrested.

69. The Iranians: Some Sharp Questions about the Soviet Regime. The Iranian government, also, banned attendance of its youth at the Festival, yet some ten Iranians arrived in Moscow, certainly not all Communist sympathizers. Two Iranian students, one of whom spoke Russian, manifested

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a sharply critical attitude toward the Soviet regime. At their meeting with the Soviet writers, the Iranians taxed the latter with the crimes of Stalin and demanded to know how the cult of personality could have arisen in a Marxist-Leninist society. The replies to this and subsequent questions asked by the Iranians merit verbatim repetition:

A - The cult of personality was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, and had resulted from the strained international and domestic political situation of the time.

Q - Why was Stalin denounced only after he had died? Were those who had worked with Stalin in leading positions not cowards for having failed to oppose him during his lifetime?

A - During the war Stalin had personified the Russian nation and it was impossible to take any action against him.

Q - And after the war?

A - The International situation again became strained.

Q - What are Soviet writers doing now to fight the cult of personality?

A - This is not a subject on which one can write a dissertation. However, the film "The Fall of Berlin," which portrayed Stalin as a genius responsible for winning the war singlehanded and ignored the role of the Party and the Army, has been taken off the screens and nothing like it can appear again.

70. The questioning mood reflected in this exchange probably cannot be taken as symptomatic of the general attitude of Iranian youth toward Communism but it is significant that at least two of the delegates had the courage

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to express themselves so openly. Recent reports indicate that the Communists are still trying to win converts among Iranian youth but that they are not making notable progress. A report from a Baghdad Pact committee on Communist subversion among students states that:

... pure Communist ideology has lost much of its power among students, at least for the time being, and the Tudeh Party is trying to regain it by various means, the main one being nationalism of the extreme and negative type. The connection between Communism and this kind of nationalism is not obvious, but it is a fact that International Communism is relying very much on it, probably because of its strongly anti-Western tendency and also because of its negative and destructive character.

The report estimates that among Iranian students in Europe as a whole not more than 10% should be regarded as Communist sympathizers. This does not mean, however, that the Communists may not make further headway among Iranian youth in the future, and the fact remains that Iran is regarded as a priority target country for Soviet propaganda.

71. The Black Africans: Mixed Reactions.

No precise count or reliable estimate of the total number of delegates from Black Africa - like the Middle East, a major target of the Communists - is available. Even the totals claimed by Festival sponsors are contradictory. In late June 1957 the International Preparatory Committee claimed to have established "direct contact" with 18 of the 20 countries in Africa and that "289 youth and student organizations" had expressed their desire to send representatives to the Festival. Komsomolskaya Pravda of July 13, 1957, claimed that 305 delegates from Black Africa and the French Antilles would attend. However, subsequent Soviet broadcasts admitted

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that little information was available about preparations in the African colonial countries and that political restrictions made it "tremendously difficult" to establish contact with youth and student organizations in Africa and stated that "126 lads and girls from colonial countries of Africa are expected to arrive" at the Festival. Scattered reports from individual Free World observers at the Festival indicate that the total number of participants from Black Africa turned out to be somewhat more than the low estimate of 126, but considerably less than the 305 originally targeted.

72. The Black Africans were accorded royal treatment in public, on TV and radio, and in the Soviet and foreign Party press. Photographs were featured showing the negro delegates arm-in-arm dancing with Caucasian girls, swapping autographs, and otherwise intermingling cordially. A large exhibition was opened in Moscow devoted to African literature. The relatively few Black Africans were, as might be expected, given conspicuous positions in one of the Festival's major political shows, the "Rally in Solidarity with the Youth of Colonial Countries" (August 2).

73. The Sudanese were by far the largest delegation from the area. It is estimated that they numbered at least 100, including some 60 who were students in Western Europe and in Soviet satellite countries (East German youth sponsored the travel of several of the Sudanese delegates). The Sudanese Government decreed that participants in the Festival would be prosecuted under the law, although the Ministry of Education had allowed five students to accept scholarships offered by Soviet universities. The Arab News Agency reported in November 1957 that the Sudanese government was taking measures against 60 persons who had defied the government's prohibition against attendance at the Festival. According to various reports, the Sudanese and many of the other Black Africans who did attend were impressed by the treatment they were accorded. An official American

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observer noted that "the impact on the individual delegate from these countries must have been considerable." In this connection an African representative remarked that "In the West children run from me, whereas here they run to me asking for my autograph or just wanting to touch me."

74. The Ghana delegates numbering a mere three showed, however, that not all African representatives at the Festival were taken in by Communist propaganda. According to a reliable British report, the Ghana trio "behaved admirably." At the anti-colonialist meeting they defended Britain against attacks from other delegations and said that "Ghana's independence proved that Britain voluntarily gave independence to its colonies when they were ready for it." The report also stated that the Ghanians became "thoroughly disgusted" with the continued Communist propaganda and went home two days before the end of the Festival.

75. The Nigerian delegation numbering no more than ten did not speak up as did the Ghanians but, according to an official Nigerian report, they also were not taken in by the Communist appeals. A warning by Nigerian Federal Commissioner, Mr. M. T. Mou, concerning the exploitation of students from overseas who took part in the Festival, was quoted in the Nigerian West African Pilot (August 26). He declared uncompromisingly:

The Soviet campaign to exploit young people in the non-Communist world for its own ends is one of the most sinister aspects of Moscow's long-term strategy. Young people who went from Nigeria realized that a special ovation is given to delegates from colonial and under-developed countries, whose sympathies the Communists are anxious to enlist, and were not deceived.

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IV. GAINS AND LOSSES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM FROM THE FESTIVAL

In attempting to draw a balance sheet of the Festival we shall present Soviet gains and losses under the five headings of Propaganda Aims, set forth in Section I. B.

A. In Imparting a Benign "New Look" to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet View.

76. Official Soviet publications leave little doubt that the Soviet leaders felt that the Festival had been a success. Shelepin, head of the Komsomol, despite his previously quoted warning to Soviet youth, said after the close of the Festival:

The Festival answered the slanderous inventions of reactionary propaganda about our country and will undoubtedly contribute to the spreading, among the youth and population of foreign countries, of the truth about . . . the truly popular nature of the Soviet social and state order . . . of the flourishing of culture.

The Festival's International Committee, summing up the results of the Festival, stated:

We met at the Festival in order to discuss in a friendly manner many vital problems which are agitating young people, wherever they may be, whatever political and religious views they may have, and whatever nationality they may belong to.

77. An even more explicit affirmation of the positive achievements of the Festival was set forth by Khrushchev.¹ In response to the question "Do you consider Youth

¹ Interview with V. Sindbaek, editor of Danski Folkestyre, Danish Youth Magazine, published in Pravda, January 15, 1958.

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Festivals the ideal way for young people of East and West to meet?" Khrushchev replied in part:

... The World Youth Festivals have very great merits . . . One still hears that the World Youth Festivals are a 'Communist undertaking'. It is said that many of the participants in the Moscow Festival were at first inclined to be wary, but on closer acquaintance they understood that there was nothing to fear. No one wants to impose his ideas or way of life on anyone, all want only one thing - to live in peace and friendship, enjoy the benefits of science and culture and help peoples to move along the road of progress and prosperity. People of different countries have different ways of life and thought. Two different systems exist today - socialist and capitalist. And for people living in these states there is no way out except to live peacefully side by side with one another, to respect each other's opinions. It seems to me that the World Youth Festivals, in bringing together representatives of the younger generation of different nations, contribute to this understanding.

Free World Views

78. Hundreds of reports giving impressions and evaluations of the Moscow Festival, both from official observers stationed in Moscow and from the vast press corps, present a widely divergent picture of the propaganda effects. There was a large measure of agreement, nevertheless, that the "new face" of the Festival was highly specious. Thus, the Hamburg independent journal Die Welt noted (August 13, 1957):

... this year's magnificent Youth Festival, in Moscow, which would be impossible anywhere else in the world on this scale, and with this make-up served, not least, to advertise the Soviet Union and its Communist social system . . .

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The London News-Chronicle (August 7) in an editorial headed "The Moscow Circus," commented:

The high jinks in Moscow make agreeable reading. Hatred seems to have taken a back seat and the young people drawn from nearly all the nations of the earth appear to be finding a unity which their elders seek in vain. The underlying tension and hostility between the West and the Communist worlds persist. The News Chronicle believes that contacts between those living under Communism and people from the outside world does more good than harm, even if the intention of the meetings is to make Soviet propaganda. But we must not ignore the fact that to the Kremlin the Youth Festival is a weapon in the cold war.

The London Socialist Commentary (September 1957) wrote:

. . . The reasons for the generosity of the Soviet Government are not far to seek. After the performance of Soviet tanks in Hungary, a far greater price would have been worth paying to make of Moscow the Mecca of a Peace and Friendship pilgrimage. The Kremlin needed this sign of support not only to break through the ring of disgust with which events in Budapest had surrounded Russia, but also to present to their own youth the picture of a world which sees in Moscow one place where Peace and Friendship blossom. This the Soviet leaders achieved. But they paid for it not only with roubles. Among the 'delegates' from the democratic West were some who were determined to tell the Russians how people really live when they are free, and from all accounts it appears that the Muscovites eagerly listened to them. For all the noise of the official propaganda trumpets these

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small voices of truth may have left a lasting effect on the minds of those Soviet people who came in contact with non-Communists from the West.

Soviet Gains

79. The Soviet leadership's desire to create an atmosphere of liberality and friendliness was greatly facilitated by the genuine enthusiasm and cordiality of the Moscow citizenry. The manifest spontaneity of their welcome to foreigners evoked a warm response even from seasoned non-Communist observers, and perhaps served to modify somewhat their conviction that the Festival was intended to be entirely a rigged Communist show. The whole show of relative moderation and tolerance exhibited during the Festival probably created a number of "missionaries of goodwill" who, even though not Communists or consciously influenced by Communist appeals, would speak well of the Soviet Union upon their return home.

80. The appearance of open-mindedness and "humaneness" probably did far more than any direct propaganda about Hungary to dull the memory of the agony of youth in Budapest. The ways in which the Poles spoke up and generally were permitted to behave in unorthodox ways was also impressive to many Free World as well as Bloc participants.

81. Above all, the new air of freedom kindled hopes among many sincere, idealistic, non-Communist youth (and perhaps even among Soviet and Bloc youth) that they were truly observing an augury of better things to come. The will to believe the best about the Soviet regime, and to live peacefully with it, and the hope that it will ultimately achieve consistency between its professed ideals and its evident practices, are still strong among many people, serious adults

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as well as youth. Americans are not alone among well-meaning Westerners in hoping that the Soviet Union will become "more like us" and develop into a freer society and a force for peace in the world.

Soviet Losses

82. In some aspects the show of liberality was rather heavy-handed. Although the police did not interfere with non-Communist speakers, they did conduct surveillance and interrogation of a number of Soviet citizens who had contacted Westerners. It was quite apparent in some of the specialized meetings that the Communists would permit free discussion to proceed just so far and then would use their customary tactics of taking over and shutting off any undesirable speeches or questions. Some of the student seminars and the meetings with Soviet writers and economists did much to dispel the myth of the new freedom and open-mindedness within the Soviet Union which the Festival sponsors had tried to create. However, only a relatively small number of delegates attended these meetings.

83. On balance, and considering the effects on the great mass of attendants at the Festival, it would appear that the gains for the USSR exceeded the losses and that the "new look" propaganda aim was probably advanced more successfully than any of the other propaganda objectives.

B. To Help Recoup Soviet Prestige Among Communist Oriented Youth of All Countries as Part of the Campaign to Stabilize International Communism.

84. The achievement of this aim may be considered from three points of view, i.e. the extent to which the Festival helped the Soviet Party leadership to (1) rewin

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the loyalty, devotion and respect of youth within other Communist countries; (2) re-establish itself as the leader, guide and mentor of Communist-oriented youth in the Free World, and (3) bolster the sagging status among world youth of the controversy-ridden major international youth front organizations, the WFDY and the IUS. The gains and losses listed below are set forth in terms of these three objectives.

Soviet Gains

85. The record-breaking attendance of some 35,000 youth from 131 countries and the world publicity given the more glamorous aspects of the Festival undoubtedly succeeded in creating within the Communist world an impression of resourceful initiative and organizational mastery on the part of the Soviet leadership. The fact that more than half of the visiting delegates were from Free World countries - and that a high percentage of those were non-Communist - created an added impression of confident strength. The Soviet leaders demonstrated that they were willing to take the chance, unprecedented in Communist circles, of allowing the political heathen to express themselves openly within the shadow of the Kremlin itself. The fact that the Poles were allowed previously unimaginable leeway in criticizing certain aspects of Soviet life and tendencies within the Communist movement must likewise have eased - at least momentarily - some of the tensions which have been building up among satellite youth since the Polish break from Stalinist orthodoxy. The great show of camaraderie at the Festival also probably tended to black out memories of the agonized cries of Hungarian youth.

86. The impact of the Festival on the Western European delegations appears to have been neither better nor worse than the Communist sponsors probably expected. Quite clearly few new converts were made from the ranks of the

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non-Communists but on the other hand, judging by post-Festival reactions and events, few of the faithful were lost to the cause. More positive gains were evidenced among the Arabs, Asian and Latin American delegates.

87. The WFDY, which had shown signs of a weakening in its hold over youth, particularly among its Free World affiliates, was no doubt reinvigorated by the outward success of the Festival. Of all the Communist fronts, the WFDY had perhaps suffered the greatest losses in prestige and membership in the latter days of Stalin. After Stalin's death it had attempted by various tactical innovations to appeal to non-Communists without changing its highly centralized and authoritarian character. In the aftermath of the 20th Party Congress it had "liberalized" itself and loosened its hold over its national affiliates. The reverberations of the Hungarian revolt threatened an irreparable split in the organization, forcing the WFDY to adopt an unprecedented policy of decentralization, placing greater emphasis upon bilateral or regional liaisons initiated by national organizations and subordinating its own role as the dictating, central authority. This reflection of the general "thaw" in world Communism, however, was only temporary. The WFDY's role in organizing the "non-political, open to all" Festival probably helped restore its standing in international youth circles. The IUS, which had been torn by inner dissent particularly after the Hungarian revolt, also must have found a badly needed restorative in the activity of the Festival.

88. The continuing process of exploiting the Moscow Festival was demonstrated by the follow-up meeting of the Fourth World Congress of the WFDY held in Kiev (16-23 August 1957). One of the directives of this Congress prescribed that correspondence contacts be maintained with all persons who had attended the Moscow event or taken part in any of its preparatory activities. The special emphasis

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placed by the Communist leaders on the need for extending the influence of WFDY and IUS in the Afro-Asian area is further evidenced by the decision of the Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference (December 1957-January 1958) to establish a regional organization for youth with affiliates throughout the area. The WFDY and IUS were officially represented at this conference and have subsequently contributed to the implementation of the Conference's decisions. The WFDY now claims that it has a total of 94 affiliates in Afro-Asian countries with a combined membership of 35 million young people. (It is assumed, however, that the Communist countries of the Far East are included in this total and probably provide the major part of the total).

89. Preparations for the next Festival in Vienna are likewise being utilized by the WFDY and IUS to strengthen themselves organizationally. Many local, national and regional "preparatory" committees for the Moscow Festival have been kept in being and are now renewing their efforts as committees for the Seventh Festival. It is quite likely that these have, in effect, become permanent bodies. It is significant that the WFDY and IUS began their organizational preparations for the next Festival much sooner after the last one than ever before in the history of their co-sponsorship of these events.

90. The success of the Moscow Festival as a stimulant to future organizational efforts among world youth - and also, significantly, as a source of recruitment of activists for the International Communist youth movement - was proclaimed explicitly¹ by N. Mikhailov, USSR Minister of Culture:

¹ Novy Mir, No. 10, October 1957.

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From the results of the 6th Festival, from its scope and breadth, there must also be drawn the conclusion that among the young people there we trained remarkable cadres of organizers and propagandists capable of rallying millions of young people for unity under the banner of a fight for peace and friendship among the peoples. (Underlining added).

Soviet Losses

91. Complaints were heard from satellite delegations (in particular the Bulgarians, the Rumanians, and to some extent the Czechs) that they were discriminated against at the Festival, i. e. given positions of less prominence than they deserved, less favored housing, food, etc. This is not the first time that the "captive" satellite delegates have been slighted at Festivals. It appeared to be a necessary consequence of the major effort to court so many other delegations, notably those from the Asian-African areas. Another complaint - from the Bulgarians at least - was that they were "put through the wringer" by their own security forces before they were permitted to go to Moscow, and were made to feel like political suspects rather than faithful supporters of the regime.

92. The Poles, while perhaps breathing more freely for the moment, because of the leeway given them in Moscow, certainly did not become any more convinced of the need for a return to orthodoxy. The much publicized riots over the suppression of the Polish student newspaper Po Prostu - which occurred about two months after the Festival - suggest that the open show of tolerance at the Festival may have stimulated the already seething heterodoxy of Polish youth.

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C. In Obtaining Support for Soviet Foreign Policy Aims

For the "Peace" Campaign

94. The most obvious political objective of the Festival centered in the theme of "peace and friendship." The end purpose was to persuade world youth that the Soviet Union was the true champion of peaceful coexistence, nuclear disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests, that the United States aggression is the major threat to peace, and that youth in all countries should campaign militantly against Western air and missile bases and the collective defense arrangements between the Free World nations. The peace motif had predominated in past Festivals but in Moscow it was intensified and dramatized by endless repetition. The opening speeches of the Communist leaders, the banners carried and the slogans chanted in every parade, the major mass meetings such as the Hiroshima Day rally, the ubiquitous white doves - real and symbolic - and the massive publicity in print and over the radio and television, all proclaimed the peace theme.

95. This saturating propaganda effort strikingly illustrated the ways in which the International Communist front organizations supplement each other. In this case, the WFDY and IUS as organizers of the Festival effectively carried out on a large scale among youth the program primarily assigned to the World Peace Council.

96. The impact of this effort would appear to have been greatest among the Communist-influenced youth of the uncommitted countries. Their will-to-believe in the Soviet Union as a force for peace, as against the allegedly imperialistic and war-mongering Western powers, was probably reinforced temporarily by the Moscow display.

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97. It is probable that the peace propaganda also affected some of the non-Communists at the Festival, even among those who readily recognized the appeals to youth as Soviet political propaganda. Many indicated that they were bored by the trite and repetitious slogans. However, the yearning for peace and for surcease from the anxiety over nuclear war probably caused some of the more naive and idealistic to leave the Festival with the feeling that, after all, the Free World powers should make stronger attempts to "meet the USSR halfway." The achievement of even this mixed effect would be a gain from the Soviet point of view. The Communist leaders do not expect to make full converts to their ideology through the Festivals; partial persuasion is a sufficient accomplishment.

D. Extension of Soviet Influence in the Afro-Asian and Latin American Areas

98. The pervasive anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist programs and the special treatment accorded the Arab, Black African and Asian delegates and as a close second, the Latin American representatives, were carefully planned phases of the intensified campaigns to extend Soviet influence in the under-developed areas.

99. The major Soviet objectives in the Afro-Asian area are to give support to national liberation movements; to foster political neutralism; to encourage the kind of Afro-Asian unity in which the Communist Bloc countries of Asia (including the USSR which claims to be an Asian country) would be accepted as full and equal partners, entitled to preferential political, cultural and economic treatment; to promote nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises, to create suspicion and if possible outright enmity toward the West and particularly the United States, and to develop economic and cultural ties with the Soviet Union. In middle

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Eastern and African countries the youth front organizations are of major importance, supplementing the activities of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Peace Council and the organizations it inspires such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference (Cairo, December 1957-January 1958). The Soviet purposes in Latin America are essentially the same, although the fostering of suspicion and enmity is even more specifically aimed at the United States.

100. Since the Moscow Festival, renewed efforts have been made by WFDY and IUS to increase the effectiveness of their programs in Latin America. The programs, exploiting the recent student demonstrations against the United States in several countries, call for solidarity between the Latin American and Afro-Asian areas in resisting "colonialism" of the United States. This theme will undoubtedly be stressed at the Seventh Festival in Vienna.

Soviet Gains

101. Upon return to their homelands the Afro-Asian, in particular the Egyptian and the Syrian delegates to the Festival, agitated for greater efforts on the part of their local youth organizations on behalf of Soviet political objectives, particularly the exacerbation of anti-Western nationalism. The WFDY Congress at Kiev, after stressing the importance of the Moscow Festival, outlined as one of the "main paths" for the activities of the WFDY the rendering of "assistance to young people of the colonial countries," and called for "common action" in favor of "rights of self-determination, freedom and national independence." The Congress, reaffirming its adherence to "the principles of the Bandung Conference," empowers its Executive Committee to organize collectives in all countries for the enlargement of the international solidarity fund and otherwise to "lend assistance to youth organizations in the colonial countries."

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102. Bruno Bernini, Communist President of WFDY, summing up the results of the Festival and the Kiev Congress, stated that one of the distinguishing features of these gatherings "was the high activity displayed by the delegates from the newly independent countries and colonies" (New Times No. 35).

103. The Latin American delegations, upon their return home, redoubled their efforts to expand or create new units of the WFDY and IUS, soliciting the membership of non-Communist individuals and organizations.

104. Propaganda themes of the Soviet Union, of a kind not ordinarily printed in the local non-Communist press, were published extensively in the newspapers and magazines of many Afro-Asian and Latin American countries as a result of the world focus on the Festival. News reports and interviews with returning delegates frequently stressed the "great progress" of the Soviet Union, the "great" city of Moscow and the "magnificence" of the Festival. Among the other post-Festival WFDY-IUS activities in the Asian-African area were the sponsoring of youth and student conferences, congresses, seminars and local "festivals" variously in such countries as Egypt, the Sudan and Senegal. Meetings of this type are regarded by the WFDY and IUS as important "bridges" enabling them to make contact with leaders of non-member organizations in target areas and as a means of propagandizing the "identity" of WFDY-IUS objectives and policies with those of the bona-fide national youth organizations, thus paving the way for the kind of united front desired by the Communists.

Soviet Losses

105. Despite extensive Communist penetration of the delegations from the "underdeveloped" areas, there was a strong note of anti-Communism. We have mentioned

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above the critical, sometimes caustic, comments of delegates from Egypt, Iraq, and Iran; and the questioning attitude of the Ghana delegates dramatized by their walkout from the Festival. Several of the Latin American delegates, previously regarded as pro-Communist, upon their return expressed sharply critical views. Thus, a Brazilian state deputy - a delegate to the Festival who had been regarded as pro-Communist - in a speech before the Sao Paolo Assembly, criticized the Soviet economic system, citing the long hours of work and the lack of consumer goods. Another deputy said that after visiting the Soviet Union "I am today more convinced than ever that Brazil despite everything is still a paradise." The President of the Pernambuco Assembly and three others, annoyed by the pre-Festival propaganda and pressures upon the Brazilian delegation, gave up the trip in Prague, returned to West Germany and then went home. Another deputy, returning to Sao Paolo, gave a series of half-hour broadcasts on the local radio uncomplimentary to the Festival and its sponsors. Members of the Brazilian Bach Chorale Society publicly criticized the Soviet regime after their return. A Sao Paolo political columnist known for "leftist" views admitted that he was disillusioned with the "marvel" of the Soviet Union after attending the Festival.

106. The flattering attention and the repeated protestations of Soviet friendship and concern for their countries, undoubtedly evoked a considerable emotional response in the delegates from the underdeveloped areas. However, the realities of life in the Soviet Union which were readily observable behind the glittering Festival facade must have raised doubts in the minds of visitors who, though from countries which are "backward" from a West European or American point of view, in many respects still enjoy a standard of living superior to that of the average Soviet citizen. To the delegates from the more advanced Latin American countries the contrast must have been even sharper.

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107. Many delegates from the underdeveloped areas talked and made friends with Western non-Communist delegates, perhaps for the first time in their lives. These person-to-person contacts were in sharp contrast to the rigged meetings and the staged propaganda of the Communists.

E. To Curb Dissent and Bolster the Faith of Soviet Youth in the Strength and Wisdom of the Party

Soviet Gains

108. The Festival provided a colorful, glamorous and "harmonious" environment in which to deliver special exhortations to Soviet youth not only to act as exemplary hosts at the Festival and as leading participants in the various events but also to press on to greater work achievements. In this respect the Festival was designed to have the same inspiring effect as a gala convention in the Free World. The speeches of Voroshilov (and later Khrushchev), Shelepin and other Communist leaders were directed as much to Soviet youth as to the delegates from foreign countries. Throughout the Festival the Soviet delegates were under strict discipline and guidance.

109. The ability to attract some 35,000 young people from more than 130 countries was calculated to - and probably did - impress the Soviet Union's own youth with the lasting appeal that the regime has abroad (despite the ugly Hungarian business), with the aplomb of the leaders in going ahead with the Festival in a time of troubles and with the continuing efficiency and dispatch of the party in organizing, and conducting such a vast and varied enterprise.

110. The show of bonhomie toward so many young men and women from all over the world, the unprecedented freedom given non-Communists to speak their minds and to mingle with the crowds in Moscow (although it was known that

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the police were always lurking in the background) must have at least momentarily confused some of the questioning Soviet youth and caused them to wonder if this was truly a sign of better things to come.

111. Soviet patriotism rode high from the initial great opening ceremony at Lenin Stadium through the ballets, concerts, exhibits and the big sports events. The Soviet leaders must have attached great weight to this manifestation of national pride and to its after-effects.

Soviet Losses

112. As indicated in Shelepin's strong warning to Soviet youth against contamination of "alien ideas, habits and customs," and in subsequent admonitions by other Communist spokesmen,¹ the regime itself admitted the incursion of some

¹One of the most explicit admissions by the Soviet regime that dissent exists within the ranks of its students is contained in an article "An Important Political Task - Upbringing of Students" by Professor A. D. Alexandrov of the USSR Academy of Sciences and rector of the A. A. Zhdanov Leningrad State University in Vestnik Vyshei Shkoly No. 3, March 1958. Repeating the theme that "this intelligentsia must be completely devoted to the cause of Communism" and that "criticism of defects in our work" is essential in achieving that goal, the university rector admits that "the general enthusiastic activity of the students is sometimes accompanied by unhealthy phenomena indicating insufficient social consciousness on the part of some of the students . . . Such students often . . . raise political questions without trying to acquire a serious grasp of them; when they talk of literature and art, they chase after originality; and they pass judgment on matters left undone without any idea of the work already accomplished to overcome the omissions. Extremes are encountered - the grossest violations of order, amoral

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unwelcome and "dangerous" manifestations at the Festival. The counter-infection, spread primarily by the Western delegates, but also by those from such countries as Iran and Ghana, was of a cultural and social as well as a political character. The strictures of the Party, Komsomol and educational leaders during and after the Festival appeared to have been as much directed against the potentially subversive impact of freedom in the arts (abstract modernism versus "socialist realism") and of individualism in literature as against "bourgeois" concepts of political freedom. It also reflected alarm over the corrupting influences of American jazz and natty Western clothing styles upon the "stilyagi," who are constantly denounced as "idlers, loafers, hooligans and delinquents."¹

113. Soviet youth were also exposed to corrosive effects of apathy and ideological impertinence manifested by some of the other Bloc delegates. The Bulgarians, Rumanians and Czechs appeared to be strikingly indifferent. The Poles, as noted above, were bold, independent, sharp questioners whose views at times bordered on heresy. While the behavior of their satellite neighbors may not have been damagingly subversive to Soviet youth, it could scarcely have passed unnoticed and may well have remained in the consciousness of the more perceptive individuals.

acts. Such instances it must be said are uncommon (and) one can deal with harmful talkers and violators of order by administrative measures. The chief thing is that the students themselves do not always rebuff such unhealthy phenomena . . . Contact with the students means reliance upon the student organizations . . . above all through the Young Communist League.

¹ A new word has been coined for another category of Soviet youth, the cynical and the bored: the "nibonicho."

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114. On balance, it would appear that the Festival as a force for bolstering the morale and loyalty of the Soviet younger generation was less effective than desired by the Communist leadership. Indeed, the generally negative results might have been far more apparent had they not been offset by the burst of pride which resulted from the post-Festival scientific and technological successes symbolized by the sputniks.

V. PREVIEW OF THE 1959 FESTIVAL

A. Vienna as the Setting for the First Festival to be Held in the Free World.

115. After considerable vacillation the Communist leadership of the WFDY and its partner the IUS have decided to hold the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna from 26 July to 4 August 1959. Peking and Prague had previously been proposed, and Colombo, Ceylon, was considered as the first Free World capital for the event. Subsequently Vienna was selected, and negotiations were opened with the Austrian Federal Government in order to make the requisite plans and arrangements. The City of Vienna objected strenuously on the grounds that the mass influx of youth delegates in mid-summer would adversely affect the prosperous tourist trade. The views of the Federal Government seem to have prevailed, however, and preparations are now being made for the holding of the event in Vienna.

Why Was Vienna Chosen?

116. Apparently the Communist leadership of the international youth front organizations first promoted Vienna as the scene for the Seventh Festival through the affiliated Austrian Communist youth organization (FOEJ) which held its

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Fifth Federal Congress in Vienna on 7-8 December 1957. Subsequently the WFDY held a conference in Vienna, decided to accept the "invitation" of the Austrian youth organization, and recommended that an already-scheduled meeting in Stockholm in March 1958 discuss the preparatory work and select an international festival committee to be responsible for the preparations.

117. Experienced Western observers of Communist sponsored youth festivals offer the following reasons why Vienna was preferred for the 1959 Festival:

- a. The Communists want to "legitimize" the festivals and their sponsoring front organizations by maintaining the impression that they are cultural and non-political in nature and are "open to all." The Kiev Congress of the WFDY urged "cooperation with all youth organizations, both national and international," stated that the activities of the WFDY "are open to all forces desiring to take part in them" and instructed its Executive Committee to continue or undertake during 1958-9 measures that would promote "acquaintance and cooperation between youth organizations of countries with different economic and social systems." The Communist leadership undoubtedly feels these aims can be achieved with greater plausibility if the next Festival is held within the Free World.
- b. A neutral country will provide a suitable psychological environment for the repetition of the "peace" themes which are predominant in Soviet foreign policy propaganda.
- c. For the Soviet view a small neutral and nearby country such as Austria is amenable to Soviet pressures and therefore is not likely to take, or to permit, any strong actions against the Festival.

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d. More youth representatives from uncommitted countries may be induced to come to a free, neutral country like Austria than would be the case if the Festival were again held behind the Iron Curtain. There would also probably be fewer restrictions placed by Free World governments on the travel of their youth to Vienna as against a Bloc capital.

e. The danger of contamination by Free World ideas will be limited to the relatively few official and well indoctrinated delegates from Bloc countries, whereas larger masses of youth might be affected - as in Moscow - if the Festival were again held in a Communist country.

f. Vienna of all Free World capitals has been willing to permit the maintenance of the headquarters of Communist front organizations, and has perhaps been more amenable than any other to Soviet pressures. If, however, the Austrian authorities - influenced by political parties and youth organizations opposed to the Festival - should decide to cancel the invitation, the Communist sponsors could readily shift the event to nearby Prague.

Austrian Opposition to the Seventh Festival

118. Since the Government's decision to permit the holding of the Festival in Vienna, Austrian political parties and youth groups have expressed strong opposition. The Social Democratic Party has forbidden its members to participate in the event. Deputies of the Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs criticized the Government in Parliament for permitting Vienna to become the site for the event. In reply the Austrian Chancellor said that as a free and democratic state Austria could not have refused.

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119. At its Congress on 6 May 1958, the Austrian National Union of Students voted to maintain strict avoidance of contacts with Communist-dominated youth organizations and not only to boycott the Seventh Festival but also to undertake definite steps against it. Subsequently the NUS formed a united action committee with the various Conservative and Catholic youth groups to plan for peaceful but positive counteraction.

120. Despite these sentiments, there appears to be the same kind of difference of opinion among non-Communists in Austria about the wisest course to be taken toward the Festival that is evident in other parts of the Free World. While the Catholic newspapers of Graz and Innsbruck were demanding in "indignant tones," according to the Communist Volkstimme of 18 May, that the Government should throw out the organizers of the Festival, the more important Catholic journal, Die Furche, editorialized that the West ought to be glad of the opportunity afforded by the Festival to show Western achievements to the tens of thousands of youth coming to Vienna from Eastern countries.

B. The Preparations.

121. The Stockholm conference selected a preparatory committee (list of names of members is given in the Appendix). Perhaps the outstanding feature of this preparatory committee is the strong emphasis once again placed on representation from the Afro-Asian and Latin American areas. The proportion from these areas is considerably higher than was the case in 1957. Of the 115 committee members of all nationalities, 63 or about 55% are from the African, Asian and Latin American countries combined, as against a total of 73 or slightly less than 50% of the 150 on the Moscow Festival's preparatory commission. On the 1959 commission, 27 of 115, or about 23%, are Latin Americans, whereas in 1957 there were 25 out of 150, or only about 17%, from South and Central Amer-

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ica. The percentage from the Afro-Asian countries remains about the same for the Sixth and Seventh Festivals. This representation would appear to indicate that appeals to the underdeveloped areas will be as much or more a feature of the Vienna as of the Moscow Festival.

Fewer Delegates, Fewer Student Seminars.

122. While the general pattern of past youth festivals will undoubtedly be followed in the forthcoming one, there may be some changes in its scope and emphasis. As previously noted, the 1959 Festival will be shorter and smaller than the Moscow event (nine days as compared with fourteen; 17,000 delegates from 124 countries instead of approximately 35,000 from 131 countries). The Communists have not as yet offered an explanation for this reduction. As previously indicated, however, it can be conjectured that the complaint of many delegates at the Moscow gathering - including some from the Bloc countries - that the events in Moscow were over-extended and produced a feeling of ennui among the participants has been heeded by the sponsors. Repetition and dragging out of the same themes, slogans and stimulated enthusiasm can defeat their own purposes if carried too far. The cut in delegates is probably in part a response to the plea of the Austrian authorities that the Festival not be the cause of crowding out any more of the regular summer visitors than is absolutely necessary. The decision to reduce the numbers is also probably the result of the Communists' belief that they can now easily control and manipulate the fewer delegates in a foreign environment. Recent information indicates that the Western delegations will be cut more than proportionately in order to make room for larger groups from the underdeveloped areas. Finally, it is believed that finances must be a factor. Even if the estimated cost of the Moscow Festival of about 100 million dollars is regarded as somewhat high, nevertheless the expenditure by the Soviet Union was still a huge one. Since much of the expense of the Vienna event will probably have to be paid in Austrian

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currency rather than in rubles, it would put an added strain on the Communist treasury unless the total cost were to be substantially reduced.

123. The commission has also decided that the experience of the past Festival shows the need to reduce the number of seminars. (It will be remembered that the student seminars in Moscow proved particularly troublesome to the Communist leaders). The committee at present intends to limit the student seminars in 1959 to the following:

- a. On methods of higher education.
- b. On the problems of technical progress and its relation to social development and technical education.
- c. On the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- d. On the problems of the economy of colonial and under-developed countries.
- e. On the role of students and their organizations in the public life of independent and colonial countries.

The only one of these topics that is similar to those at the 1957 Festival is the one on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It would appear significant that such outstandingly well-attended seminars as those in Economics, Philosophy, and Literature at the Moscow Festival will not be repeated in Vienna, presumably because these were the "controversial" fields which gave too much opportunity for challenging the Communist line. The faculty meetings included in the Moscow program have been re-named "study tours," and while recommended by the commission, the terms betray hesitation and a

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deliberate vagueness of approach. There is a long list of seminar topics which include biology, mining, electricity, astronomy, music, films and others, but there are no indications of the form or length of the meetings, people who would conduct them, or their purpose other than to facilitate an exchange of ideas between students engaged in the same type of studies.

124. According to USIA, the growing importance of the seminars as propaganda vehicles is evident from the proposed agenda for Student Day.¹ It is to reach a climax at the opening of the seminar on the role of students and their organizations in the public life of independent and colonial countries. Besides perennial anti-colonial slogans, the subjects will probably include the condemnation of Anglo-American intervention in the Middle East and the role of students in the anti-Nixon demonstrations in Latin America. Two other seminars, described as "important" without further specification, are also to be initiated on that day.

125. The IUS is in charge of planning all the student activities. The seminars and study tours are to be held in the International Student Club, which the preparatory committee envisages as a permanent center, presumably to be left in Vienna as a memento of the Festival. The club is to include a special student restaurant, a lecture hall, an information center and rooms for private discussions. The program does not indicate whether IUS contemplates erecting a new building for this purpose or acquiring an existing property. In either event, the Austrian authorities, who in the past have taken pains to expel other front organizations, will have the final word. The establishment of a permanent IUS center in Vienna, under whatever auspices or label, may

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USIA: IRI/FI Briefing Note, August 1, 1958.

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prove to be more than neutral Austria would see fit to tolerate.

The Vocational and Study-Interest Meetings Proposed.

126. The committee has proposed that the vocational meetings be arranged so as to attract more students and not merely the journeymen practitioners in the various fields. Meetings between students engaged in the same studies or taking an interest in the same questions are stated to be "very desirable." The commission suggests that the IPC should consider, in the light of the possibilities at the venue of the Festival, organizing the following vocational and professional meetings:

Biology	Theology
Geology	Philosophy
Chemistry	Law
Agriculture	History and Archaeology
Medicine	Teaching
Mines	Literature and Philology
Electricity	Music
Mathematics & Physics	Plastic Arts
Architecture & Building	Film
Astronomy	Foreign Trade
Inter-space Travel	Physical Culture
Organization of Economy	and Sport
	Student Cooperation

127. Preparations for the cultural and sports events appear to be following the programs of past Festivals very closely. The Soviet Government will send the Bolshoi Ballet and other dance troupes. There will be exhibitions in the fine arts and the usual contests in all the arts. Hobbyists will again be provided with special attractions.

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128. The program planners can be counted on to assure the customarily large number of regional and inter-delegation meetings. At the Warsaw (1955) and Moscow Festivals, the Soviet delegation performed the formidable feat of calling in person on practically every non-Bloc delegation. The Chinese delegation performed similarly in Moscow, and other Bloc delegations were also assigned to call on Free World representatives. Much of the important political business of the Festivals is conducted by means of the inter-delegation meetings. A striking example at Moscow was the visit of the Chinese delegation to the American participants at which time the invitation to tour Communist China was extended. The acceptance of this invitation and the subsequent events were cited by the Soviets as constituting one of the real "successes" of the Festival. (The Americans were also called on by the Soviet, the Hungarian, and the Polish delegations).

129. It should be emphasized that all meetings at the Festival, no matter how innocuously non-political they may appear to be - such as the vocational, artistic, hobby and even the sports get-togethers - are designed by the Communists to have an ideological and propaganda content and to lead to the adoption of proposals for action. Free World participants in such get-togethers should be aware of this Communist intent so that they will not be taken in.. At the same time, they should be prepared to take advantage of any of the open discussions or question periods which occur at such meetings. The smaller meetings, in fact, offer far greater possibilities for opposing voices to make themselves heard. They are not, and probably cannot be, so completely rigged and controlled as the large mass meetings at which few or any get a chance to speak.

The Propaganda Aims and Probable Themes of the Vienna Festival.

130. At this time there are indications that the organizers of the Vienna Festival are still somewhat uncertain

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about the precise content of the program for the event, and they appear to lack their usual confidence regarding its ultimate success. As late as September 1958, dispatches of the IPC to organizing committees throughout the world betrayed concern about existing opposition, particularly that of the Austrian youth organizations, pled for stronger support, and implied that plans have not progressed as well as they should have. The risks involved in choosing a Western country for the Festival apparently are making themselves evident early in the planning phase.

131. From the propaganda standpoint, it is clearly the intent of the organizers to serve essentially the same aims and to repeat the same basic themes as in the case of the Moscow Festival, although there will probably be several changes in emphasis and refinements in detail. The language of the preparatory committee's early general announcements sounds almost identical with that of the Sixth Festival. The committee in March 1958 stated that there was unanimous agreement that "The Seventh Festival must be an event devoted to friendly meetings and mutual understanding for 'peace and friendship'" and that it "should be open to all organizations and to all young people without discrimination as to their religious or political opinions, race or nationality. No political, philosophical or religious tendency should dominate the Festival." This also echoes almost verbatim the language of the directives of the WFDY's Kiev Congress and is very similar to the substance of the CPSU's most recent slogans directed at united front efforts and at the role of youth. The statement confirms the view that the major motifs of the Moscow gathering - "peace" and the attempt to create an atmosphere of open-minded international togetherness - will continue to predominate in Vienna.¹

¹ That the "hard" and the "soft" line represent a continuum of tactics in the youth, as in other fronts, was sharply demonstrated by the IUS Congress at Peking, 4-13 September 1958, -

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132. The more specific propaganda themes of the Vienna Festival will also be in large part a repetition of those of the 1957 Festival, updated and tailored to serve the current Soviet and Communist Chinese political ends. In view of the resolutions of the WFDY Congress and of the recent statements about preparations for the Seventh Festival, the major Communist propaganda efforts in Vienna will be directed toward well established targets.

(1) "Solidarity" with Youth of the Colonial Countries

133. Appeals to the young people of the colonial and other underdeveloped areas (including the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin-America) will be one of the most insistent features of the Vienna Festival. The WFDY Congress proclaimed that "the existence of colonialism is dangerous to all humanity and there is need for agreement between all youth organizations for the purpose of expediting its abolition." The Congress instructed the Executive Committee "to support or launch measures to advance the struggle of the young people in all colonial countries." As previously stated, the Executive committee was also directed to organize collections in all countries for the international solidarity fund to help finance WFDY activities in the Afro-Asian area. Undoubtedly WFDY expects a substantial amount to be collected at the Festival for this purpose.

the most shrill, blatantly political IUS meeting since the 1950 Congress in Prague. Most of the time was spent in denouncing American "imperialism," calling for the "liquidation" of Western military bases and the withdrawal of Western troops from foreign soil, propagandizing for such immediate Communist Chinese aims as the evacuation of the offshore islands and organizing noisy mass demonstrations against US Secretary of State Dulles, the US Seventh Fleet and the American convoying of supplies to the offshore islands.

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134. Current issues of WFDY and IUS publications, looking toward the Vienna Festival, place primary emphasis upon the colonial issue. WFDY's official journal World Youth (No. 7, August 1958, in its lead article "East is East and West is West") states:

The world has changed considerably since Kipling cynically wrote: 'East is East and West is West, never the twain shall meet.' It was, of course, impossible for the twain to meet in friendship when colonialism came to the East as master - not friend. However, it was and still is wrong to think that this West would always be master and the East would eternally remain slave. Also, the barrier between the two people could not continue forever . . . The Youth Festivals are now one of the best accepted forums for youth from all countries to sing, dance, play and meet each other in an atmosphere of cordiality - a place where thousands of young people from all over the world gather together. East and West meet here - if not in the geographical sense, in the spirit of it. It is the duty of all of us to see that they meet this time in Vienna - at the Seventh Festival being held there in 1959 - in an atmosphere which would surpass all previous meetings of this kind. Youth dreams of a situation where it will not be East remaining east and West as west but the 'twain' meeting in a friendly embrace with joy and love - with no shadow of guns and slavery." (Underlining added).

135. Inextricably interwoven with the cause of colonialism will be, as in the past, the playing up of racial intolerance in the West, particularly in the United States. It is hardly likely that mention will be made by the Communists of the recent US Supreme Court decisions ordering desegregation but it can be expected that the Festival programmers will make every effort by word, print and picture to

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emphasize the unpleasant incidents surrounding attempts to integrate the schools in some parts of the United States. The recent and unusual race riots in London will probably likewise be featured.

(2) Campaign against The "Atomic Menace," for "Security Disarmament and Peace"

136. The "peace" line in Vienna, probably regarded by the Festival sponsors as especially appropriate for world meeting in neutral Austria, will be a continuation - and perhaps an intensification - of the type of peace propaganda seen in Moscow. The WFDY Congress' number one resolution indicated the nature of the peace motif: "The basis for cooperation can be agreement between all youth organizations for joint action for the immediate cessation of tests and for prohibition of thermonuclear weapons." Although attacks on the United States and other Western powers and on such treaty organizations as NATO and the Baghdad Pact may be toned down because of the general Communist intent of creating a friendly, urbane impression in Vienna, the peace propaganda will probably include at least oblique references to the need for eliminating Western air and missile bases, the elimination of the "aggressive" treaty organizations and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

(3) To "Disseminate Culture" Among Youth

137. A propaganda aim more clearly defined than at the Moscow Festival is to promote seminars, study-groups and exchange programs in and for all countries, for the ostensible purpose of improving the culture of youth. At the Vienna Festival, the WFDY and IUS, according to the directives of their Congresses, will presumably initiate a large amount of organizational work looking toward (a) "exchange of delegations and experience between cultural

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organizations of youth of various countries, and bilateral agreements for international tours of artists, for exchanging scholarships to academies, institutes, art centers," and (b) "international contests in creative endeavor and performance, in various fields of art and culture." This stepped-up cultural campaign represents the more sophisticated approach of the Communist youth front organizations in appealing to students and other youth with cultural interests. The ideological and political purposes are basically the same as in the more forthright propaganda appeals, but they are clothed in academic and artistic garb in order to make them appear to be impartial, non-political, and humanistic. (Throughout the current appeals of the WFDY and IUS the "spirit of humanism" is emphasized as underlying the purposes of their programs).

138. Thus it becomes quite apparent that, although in Vienna the Communists may encounter more opposition than they did in their Moscow Festival, they will work unremittingly for essentially the same propaganda purposes. If anything, they will drive harder and more trenchantly, combining direct attack with more subtle approaches to achieve success.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Success of Festival from Soviet Point of View

139. In sheer number of participants and in the amount of world attention accorded it, the Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students was probably all that the Communist sponsors expected it to be, although they were probably disappointed that they did not get more mandated delegates from Free World youth organizations and from some of the African and Asian nations. As the largest international meet-

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ing of any kind ever held within the Communist Bloc it called for the heaviest expenditure of effort and money ever devoted by the Soviet Union to a mass gathering.

140. The extent to which the Soviet leadership really felt that its large investment paid adequate returns is a matter of conjecture. The fact, however, that the Communist Youth leaders are going full speed ahead with plans for the next Festival in 1959 would indicate that on the whole they were satisfied with the results of the 1957 event. Officially, leading Party spokesmen such as Khrushchev, Shelepin and Voroshilov have proclaimed the Moscow event an unparalleled success. N. Mikhailov, Minister of Culture of the USSR, stated that there was "no doubt that Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students was one of the greatest events of our time," and that among other favorable results it had proved to be a fruitful recruiting and training ground for young "propagandists and organizers." Somewhat more specifically, V.I. Popov, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, in a public lecture at the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow on 6 March 1958, gave the following as successes achieved by the Festival:

a. Moscow was spotlighted as the center of the world peace movement;

b. The freedom given foreigners, including Americans, of all shades of political opinion was proof of the liberality of the Soviet regime;

c. The trip of 42 American youths to China damaged the American policy of refusal to recognize the Peking regime;

d. The "good side" of Soviet life was shown to young people from all over the world, and

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e. The Festival demonstrated that "there is no need to fear Communism."

141. The real propaganda aims of the Festival were readily determinable prior to the event. The happenings at the Festival and their aftermath have confirmed the nature of those aims. In a balance of the gains and losses for the USSR in attempting to achieve its four major propaganda goals, the following conclusions are reached:

a. The Festival was instrumental in conveying to many of the delegates and onlookers in Moscow, and to some extent to the outside world, an impression of a new political and cultural liberality on the part of the Soviet Union.

b. The show of more tolerance than would have been imaginable in the past, and its implication of confident strength on the part of the Soviet regime, also helped partially to restore Soviet prestige among the youth of the Communist world and thus to aid in stabilizing the International Communist movement. While the reverberations of the Hungarian uprising were not entirely stilled, they were effectively damped by the Festival. Youth from the satellite countries - except for the Poles - were generally passive and obedient, although there were some grumblings that Bloc youth was discriminated against in favor of delegates from uncommitted areas. Polish questioning and dissent, while a striking feature of the Festival, was kept within the tolerable bounds of ideological family differences.

c. The propaganda aim of enlisting foreign youth and youth organizations on behalf of Soviet foreign policy objectives was achieved only in part. The transparent and often heavy-handed attempts to obtain mass

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youth support at obviously Communist dominated "peace" rallies, and the constant dinning of the "Peace and Friendship" theme tended to repel rather than to attract the non-Communists. They also appear to have bored large numbers of the faithful party-line followers. The Hiroshima Day anti-nuclear-weapons rally (a fixture at youth festivals) may have made some impression on newcomers but according to foreign observers did not evoke the fervent response hoped for by the sponsors.

d. The second Soviet foreign propaganda objective, the extension of Soviet influence in the Afro-Asian and Latin American areas, appears to have met with considerable, but by no means uniform, success. The Afro-Asians as a whole responded favorably to the welcome accorded them in Moscow and to Soviet blandishments, but there were several instances of discontent and criticism. Furthermore, the Communist organizers must have felt a sense of frustration that so many of the African and some of the Asian "delegates" had to be co-opted from among students resident abroad rather than being genuinely mandated representatives of the youth of their countries. The walkout of the Ghana delegation was symptomatic of the fact that not all black Africans were taken in by the studied flattery. Furthermore some of the Arab delegations, notably the Egyptian and the Syrian, embarrassed their hosts by exaggerated nationalistic behavior in an environment primarily intended to idealize a world "brotherhood" of youth. The adulation shown the Israeli delegates, Communist and non-Communist alike, by the Jewish community of Moscow was also embarrassing to the Soviet hosts. The regime's sharp discrimination against the young Israelis (because of the need to curry favor with the Arabs) served perhaps more strikingly than any other aspect of the Festival to cast doubt on Moscow's claim to impartiality in its

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treatment of all participants from abroad. In fact these incidents show that the Communists do not always possess the unerring foresight often attributed to them in organizing their propaganda shows, for if they had, they would have taken steps to prevent such embarrassments.

e. The domestic propaganda intent of the Soviet leadership to utilize the Festival as a means of bolstering the morale and curbing the dissent of Soviet youth appears to have resulted in at least as many negative as positive results. The gala events no doubt evoked sentiments of national pride and patriotism among the young Soviet participants and on-lookers. This tonic effect, however, was probably more than offset by the exposure to forbidden "bourgeois" ideas and beliefs expressed by scores of visiting non-Communists, by the evidences of apathy among many of the satellite youth, and by the near-heresy of their young Polish comrades.

142. One of the greatest Soviet gains from the Festival's Afro-Asian program was the stimulus it gave to new organizing efforts in that area on the part of the WFDY and IUS affiliates. Their cooperation with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo at the end of 1957, their assistance in implementing its decisions and their setting in motion of other meetings and activities among African youth demonstrated vividly the tactic of following up the Festival with supporting operations.

143. The Latin American delegates were predominantly seasoned young Communists or fellow-travelers but a few dissenters were present, making themselves heard, if not at the gathering itself, then immediately after their return home. No significant regional youth conferences followed the

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Festival but there is strong evidence that Communist organization and infiltration efforts among the students of Latin America were intensified and that they have played an effective role in the wave of recent student demonstrations in Argentina, Uruguay and Panama.

B. Lessons for the Free World Bearing on the Next Festival

144. The Moscow Festival offered convincing proof of the USSR's continued mastery of publicity and management techniques applied to mass political activity. To attract and to monitor approximately 35,000 young people from more than 130 countries at a time when the Soviet prestige among world youth was at its lowest ebb since the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Soviet invasion of Poland, was no small accomplishment. It demonstrated in other respects, however, that the CPSU is not infallible and that its propaganda is not always as effective as it probably likes to believe or as the Free World tends to fear.

145. The Moscow Festival conclusively pointed to the need for greater perceptiveness on the part of Free World countries, East and West, of the true aims and objectives of the international youth festivals, and for the development of a common attitude and carefully planned counteractions if the Communists are to be prevented from utilizing such occasions to score repeated political propaganda successes. The deadly serious purposes of these gatherings held in an atmosphere of combined carnival gayety, cultural enlightenment and simulated peace and friendship, must be more fully recognized and publicized, particularly in countries where a considerable part of the youth may be naively impressed with the specious idealism of the Festival's aims.

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146. The experience of the Moscow Festival and the evidence concerning the nature and aims of the 1959 gathering point to a number of considerations which should be taken into account in the formulation by Free World countries of sound policy and effective action against the Vienna Festival:

a. Since all previous festivals have resulted in net propaganda gains for the Communists and since the specific propaganda aims of the forthcoming Seventh Festival are readily discernible, it would be better for the Free World if the event could be prevented altogether, or at least if the Communists could be denied the advantages of holding it in a Free World country. Since, however, it does not at this time appear likely that either of these desiderata will be realized, the Free World must proceed on the assumption that the next Festival will be held as planned in Vienna and determine what kind of measures will be most effective against it. The fact that this will be the first youth festival ever held in a Free World locale, while offering some propaganda advantages to the Communists, will also open up unparalleled opportunities for exploiting Communist vulnerabilities.

b. Whatever measures are devised by Free World countries must be designed to steer between two extremes, either of which would redound to the benefit of the Communists: The first would be to take action which, instead of deflating or debunking the Festival, would tend on the contrary to play up or build up the event. Such actions would include encouragement of Free World youth and student organizations to send official, mandated representatives to Vienna. Any attempt to organize large scale counter-attractions - a "competing" youth festival in effect - would only add luster to the Communist-sponsored gathering. To the

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delegates and the spectators, prominent events intended to serve as counter-attractions might well be indistinguishable from the planned Communist program and would serve to add to the entertainment and glamor of the occasion, thereby benefitting the Communists. The featuring of noted Free World singers, actors and other artists, of large shows and musical productions, or of prominent athletes and sports teams, would all probably be welcome grist for the Communist mill. On the other hand, militant counter-demonstrations or any forceful attempts to "take over" the Festival also would probably boomerang against the Free World, giving the Communists the basis for a propaganda claim that hooligan "reactionaries" were disrupting a peaceful, friendly, non-political gathering of youth. The other extreme to be avoided by the Free World is to do nothing or to take measures so relatively weak and ineffective that the Communists could laugh them off.

c. Thus it would appear to be a wise course of action for Free World countries to urge an organizational boycott of the Seventh Festival by youth and student groups whose presence in Vienna would add prestige to the occasion. On the other hand, the experience of the Moscow Festival indicates that it would also be the better part of wisdom not to prohibit or discourage "unofficial," voluntary attendance at the Festival by well-motivated, politically sophisticated, articulate young people who could ably express the points of view of the Free World in the discussions on international political issues which will inevitably be raised by the Communists at the Festival. The Moscow Festival demonstrated the effectiveness of such person-to-person debates and contacts. The personal meetings proved to be an effective means of "reaching" the Communist Bloc youth. It is much more difficult to impede individual conversations during a large and "open" gathering than to jam radio broadcasts or censor reading matter. In Vienna it should be even more difficult for the Communists to control such contacts than it was in Moscow.

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d. The need for well-grounded, politically aware Free World youth will be even greater in Vienna than in Moscow. The reduction by about 50% in the total number of delegates will, according to announced Festival plans, fall most heavily on the Bloc delegations. This means that the Soviet Bloc representatives will be a smaller, tighter, more cohesive group than in Moscow and will undoubtedly be selected from among the best indoctrinated and the most reliable young activists in the entire Communist orbit. Thus it will require greater skill and better preparation on the part of the non-Communists to cope with them. It should be remembered that the delegations from the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, even if not preponderantly pro-Communist, will contain a sizeable proportion of youth with biases of anti-imperialism, neutralism and militant nationalism. Hence, it is important that not only Western nations but the uncommitted countries make every effort to assure that of those who do go to the Festival, as large a proportion as possible are aware of the Communist aims, organization and modus operandi, and are ready and willing to expose and counter them. It should be remembered, also, that the effect of reasoned counter-statements by non-Communists at the Festival will be felt not merely by the participants but by the youth and general citizenry back in their own countries. Broad-scale international newspaper and radio coverage will undoubtedly be given to the Vienna festival.

e. The Moscow Festival also demonstrated that the presence of qualified Free World individuals could be effective not only in the informal contacts but in the important and pre-planned vocational, professional and regional get-togethers and in the interdelegation meetings. There was little advance planning for the Free World participation in such meetings in Moscow, and

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a number of opportunities for effective counter-activity were probably lost. Nevertheless, the spontaneous expression of dissenting views by individuals from Free World countries was apparently so disturbing to the Communists - especially in the cases of the Philosophy and Economic seminars - that the planners for the Seventh Festival have eliminated all sessions of this type. As indicated above, the preparatory commission for the Seventh Festival has reduced the total number of seminars and intends to limit them to seemingly innocuous subjects which, of course, still have their political purposes. The other types of get-togethers, however, remain essentially the same as those held in Moscow.

f. For these reasons it would appear that the missionary value to the Free World in permitting politically-conscious youth to attend the next Festival would outweigh the limited propaganda advantages the Communists might gain by claiming that their presence is proof of Free World approval of the Festival. At the same time, every effort should be made by Free World countries, particularly those of underdeveloped areas, to limit the attendance of impressionable and susceptible participants who, by swelling the numbers of their delegations, would add to claims of Communist success in their ability to appeal to the youth of the world.

116. In addition to measures designed to assure that Free World youth who do attend are knowledgeable and competent, other counter-activities in Vienna could include: (a) book exhibits and giveaway programs, featuring paper-back editions of books which have been proscribed by the Communist authorities in their own countries (e.g. Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago and Djilas's The New Class) and free copies of magazines of special interest to youth and students; insofar as time and expense would

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permit, the book giveaways should be translated into the more important Bloc languages; they should also be made available to youth of the underdeveloped areas in languages known to them; (b) film showings, especially pictures not normally permitted behind the Iron Curtain; (c) concerts, particularly of the smaller chamber-music and "jazz-combo" type, in considerable numbers at various locations in and around the Festival, making sure that they are identified not as part of the Festival program but as a contribution from Free World youth; likewise in as large numbers as possible, Western recordings to be provided in listening booths and some also to be given as gifts or sold at a very low price (in Moscow these were avidly sought by Bloc youth and commanded large prices on the black market); (d) organization of "Kaffeeklatsch" meetings in the Vienna cafes, open to all Festival delegates but again clearly earmarked as Free World youth's contribution.

117. Such efforts would have the distinct advantage of appealing to youth both from the Bloc and from the remoter parts of the Free World without being either excessively expensive or creating too much of a publicity built-up for the Festival. They would represent the kind of subdued but effective measures which could help to offset the massive Communist propaganda efforts at the Festival and to exemplify the Free World's interest in honestly informing and trying to help the youth and students of the world. Insofar as possible these should be undertaken on a private basis, enlisting the aid and the contributions of business firms, foundations and other organizations in order both to avoid any implication of governmental participation and to demonstrate to world opinion the willingness of voluntary groups not directly involved in the cold war to help thwart the huge Communist propaganda effort.

118. In summary, any policy and measures of the Free World countries in relation to the Seventh Festival should be governed by the following aims:

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(1) They should serve to counteract or neutralize the propaganda impact which the Communists hope to achieve through the Festival. In so doing they should avoid playing up and adding prestige to the Festival.

(2) They should exploit to the maximum the vulnerabilities inherent in the location of the Festival in a Free World city and should utilize the Festival's platforms and meetings to propagate positive Free World values, principles and ideas, rather than negative anti-Communist themes.

(3) They should serve to discredit the Communist leadership of the Festival and of the two international youth front organizations which are its immediate sponsors. The experience of the Moscow Festival indicates that effective Free World counteraction at Vienna is feasible provided imaginative planning and energetic effort are developed well in advance.

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APPENDIX

MOST FREQUENT QUESTIONS ASKED THE AMERICAN
PARTICIPANTS IN MOSCOW, AND TYPICAL ANSWERS

The questions asked the American participants on the streets, in the parks and at the various meetings, whether challenging, inimical, or relatively friendly, gradually fell into a repetitive pattern. It is believed that these questions and the kinds of answers given them by the Americans are of sufficient general interest to merit repeating as composites of the current thinking, state of knowledge and curiosity of the young Soviet questioners. Some of these questions will be recognized immediately as typically provocative Communist propaganda queries, usually asked by a party activist assigned to the task. Others, parroting the party line, may have been asked innocently by young Russians who knew no better or who sincerely wanted an answer to what had been taught them for years. The answers were not always as clear-cut or as succinct as they are put down here. Some of the less sophisticated Americans simply did not know the right answers. The answers cited are essentially and "typically" those given on several occasions and at various places. The Americans at the Festival had not in any planned way anticipated the questions or worked out any standard replies. Yet among the best of them there grew out of their separate experiences a remarkable unanimity about what to say and how to say it.

General

Q - Will you be punished by your Government for coming to the Festival?

A - No. Our Government did not want us to come in view of the Soviet actions against youth and students in Hungary. But since we chose to come on our own, we will not be punished in any way.

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Q - When did you learn to speak Russian?

A - At the university. (Some learned Russian at home).

Q - How do you like Moscow? How does it compare with New York?

A - We enjoy being in Moscow. It is difficult to compare it with New York which has a much larger population and which has its unique individuality even among American cities. (Some of the Americans had brought picture postcards of New York and other American views which they would pass out among the audience).

Economic Questions

Q - How much does an unskilled worker earn?

A - That depends upon the type of work and the strength of his union. There is a minimum wage law in the United States. On the average an unskilled worker would earn \$50-\$75 per week (astonishment when the listeners translated this into rubles).

Q - Do the workers have real unions?

A - Yes, indeed. Some of the unions are very powerful and have succeeded time and time again in getting higher wages and shorter hours for the workers.

Q - How much does a skilled worker earn? An engineer?

A - Again, that depends on the type of work, the strength of the union and demand. In general a skilled worker gets about \$80-\$100 per week. Engineers are very much in demand and are paid an entrance salary of

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\$5,000-\$6,000 per year when they are just out of college. From there on they range to \$10,000-\$15,000 and more, depending on type of engineering, and the individual ability of the engineer.

Q - How much does a teacher earn?

A - This depends on the individual states and communities. In the USA there is no uniform national system of public schools but each locality determines its own program, teachers' salaries and curricula. Most Americans feel that their teachers are still relatively underpaid. At present the average for the country is probably in the neighborhood of \$3,000-\$5,000 for elementary teachers and about \$5,000-\$8,000 for high school teachers. Other questions in the pay-and-price field which received varying answers from the Americans were:

How much does a meal in a restaurant cost?

How much does a week of meals cost?

How much do you pay for living accommodations?

What proportion of a person's earnings go for an apartment?

Do most people live in apartments?

How much does a television set cost?

How many people are unemployed in the United States?

Does a person get paid for his days off?

Does he get paid more for overtime work?

How much does an automobile cost?

How much is a pair of shoes?

(One of the American interlocutors, well-versed in American consumer economics, bewildered his audience of Soviet students and workers when he told them the average monthly pay of an industrial worker in the United States would be enough to buy about 10 suits of clothes or 47 pairs of shoes. Mem-

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bers of the Soviet group admitted that the average Russian industrial worker has to work about two to three months to buy one mediocre suit and could buy no more than 5 or 6 pairs of shoes with one month's pay).

Political Questions

Q - Why is the United States against elimination of nuclear testing and disarmament?

A - We do not and cannot represent the US Government in any way so we cannot speak for the official policy of our country. But it is our impression that the United States does want nuclear disarmament, including an end to nuclear testing, and the establishment of an effective inspection system. But this action cannot be unilateral. There has to be agreement on many matters involving world disarmament. You must know and believe that the American people and our Government genuinely want world peace and have proved it by their actions in the past.

Q - If you really mean that you do not want war with us, why do you maintain a ring of air bases all around the Soviet Union? Why don't you take your troops out of Europe?

A - The US maintains its bases only because of the constantly menacing attitude of your Government. You have eliminated Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania as independent states; you have maintained troops in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria since the war. You tried to blockade Berlin. You instigated the Korean war and your leaders still want to communize the world. This is why the United States and the rest of the Free World regard the Soviet Union with apprehension and why we maintain a defensive perimeter around you.

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Q - If America is not really imperialist what does she want?

A - The United States wants a peaceful and free world. By peace we mean a state of affairs in which no country wants to conquer or dominate another, or generally to use force to settle international disputes. By "free" we mean that every country should decide for itself by free voting the kind of government it wants. You do not permit the Eastern European countries under Soviet control to decide for themselves the political and social system they want but impose upon them a Soviet Communist regime.

Q - Is there any ideological difference between your two major parties in the United States?

A - As you think of ideology as meaning a set of "class" ideas and purposes opposed to those of another class, no. The Republicans and the Democrats are both committed to the idea of democracy within a republic. They both have moderately "left" and "right" elements. But on important national and international issues they offer strong opposition, one to the other. The absence of bitter class struggle between the two is what provides the relative peace and stability of American politics. If, in recent years, there has been a basic philosophical difference between them it is that the Republicans are somewhat more in favor of allowing as much leeway as possible to free enterprise while the Democrats are more inclined to advocate governmental regulation or control of the economy. (Several variations of this answer were given by various young Americans who were asked the same question but the one cited above appears to be the most typical).

Q - Why did you execute the Rosenbergs?

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A - Because they were convicted of espionage against the United States. They had an open and fair trial lasting two years, in the best judicial tradition of our courts. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court before the final decision. (Two or three American speakers who had learned to anticipate this question compared the Rosenberg's trial with the purge trials in the Soviet Union and with the more recent execution of Lavrenti Beria. Apparently this comparison helped carry conviction with the Soviet audiences who seemed to be impressed).

Q - Why don't you permit people from the Soviet Union to travel in the United States?

A - Who says we don't permit them? We have delegations from the USSR coming all the time, such as agricultural workers, technicians, cultural groups. The reason that more don't come is that your government won't let them.

Q - Isn't that because you insist on fingerprinting our visitors?

A - That is probably an excuse. It is true that we require fingerprinting but it is also true that once in the country the Soviet visitor, like any other, can go anywhere he pleases without constantly showing, or turning over, his passport at hotels or reporting to the police. Furthermore, we have no internal passports as you do here. (This answer was given before the fingerprinting requirement was eliminated by the US Government).

Q - In general, what do the American people think of the Soviet Union?

A - This, of course, is the most difficult kind of question to answer. It is not possible for any one of us to speak

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for 170 million of our countrymen. There are many different views and feelings among so vast a population and there are undoubtedly large numbers of people who are so preoccupied with the daily business of making a living that they don't give much thought to the problems of world politics. But if one could generalize about the opinions of the more interested and aware Americans who follow world events, their views might be expressed as follows: First, there is a tremendous reservoir of good will for the Soviet people. There has never been a serious conflict between Russians and Americans; historically we have been friends, not enemies, although we have never known enough about each other. The heroism and sacrifices of the Soviet people during World War II are still fresh in American memories. Second, there is a tremendous desire to live in a friendly and peaceable way with the Soviet Union. The enthusiasm and cordiality shown the few visiting groups you have sent should be proof of that. It is a positive kind of friendliness, not mere courtesy or formal politeness. The vast majority of Americans would cheer if there could be sincere genuine collaboration between our countries, not only to prevent the horrible mutual destruction of a nuclear war but to work together for the benefit of the rest of the world. Third - and this is the other side of the question - they do not trust the motives and the aims of your Government, particularly in view of its role as being the "vanguard" of World Communism. They wish your leaders could genuinely adopt a policy of "live and let live" instead of what seems to Americans a constant stirring up of trouble and a menacing attitude. (This question and its answer would often be made up of several sub-questions and with respect to particular aspects of US-Soviet relations).

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Questions on Hungary

Q - Why hasn't the United States been willing to accept the Soviet Union's policy of international conciliation?

A - Because, frankly, it does not believe that it is a true policy of conciliation. For instance, the Soviet policy toward Hungary was hardly conciliatory, even though Mikoyan promised Imre Nagy that it would be so.

Q - What do you mean?

A - Do you mean to say you know nothing of Mikoyan's visit to Nagy during the Hungarian uprising? (Murmurs from crowd: "No, tell us about it.")

Q - Well, what is your version of how the uprising began?

A - It was the same way as in the Soviet Union when Dudintsev and other writers began to protest against ideological restrictions. In Hungary the writers of the Petofi Club called a meeting to demand freedom for writers. They were joined by students and were supported by the industrial workers who chose the occasion to protest their miserable living conditions. What was at first a mild protest blossomed into a real revolution.

Q - Why did the counter-revolutionaries join them?

A - There were no counter-revolutionaries in the sense that you use that term. The only counter-revolutionaries in the true sense were the AVH (secret police). The students, workers and other people were unarmed. They marched to the broadcasting studio unarmed. Not a shot was fired at first. Not even the Soviet soldiers fired. Later many of the Soviet troops gave their arms to the people after the AVH started firing on the crowd. Did you know that? (Apparently the crowd did not).

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Q - If this demonstration was spontaneous, how is it that they marched with such deliberate intent to storm the radio station?

A - Do you know who taught them to march on the radio station? You did. You compelled them to read Lenin and to learn Communist revolutionary tactics. The actions of the Hungarian insurgents were right out of Lenin's "What Is To Be Done" and "A Tale and Revolution."

Q - Didn't the Hungarians obtain arms from the Americans? The Americans sent balloons ostensibly with medical supplies but these really were used to parachute guns.

A - That's a lie.

Q - Didn't the Hungarian government request Soviet armed assistance?

A - This is the truth of the matter: When the Soviet Government saw that it was losing control of Hungary it sent Mikoyan with proposals to Nagy for a compromise similar to that reached in Poland. An agreement was signed with Nagy, officially recognizing the Nagy government as legal. After Mikoyan left, the Soviet government betrayed its agreement and ordered fresh Soviet troops into Hungary to replace the less reliable troops on duty there. Nagy fled to the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. Kadar was installed in his place and the Soviet army proceeded to drown the Hungarian uprising in blood. Nagy was lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy by promises of immunity and was then seized by the Soviet secret police. This is the way the Hungarian revolution was suppressed and the way in which Nagy was betrayed. (After this statement, there was an extended back-and-forth discussion but no especially new points were made

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by either side. The Soviet listeners appeared quite amazed at the speaker's recital of the facts about Hungary).

Social Questions

Q - Why do you discriminate against negroes in the United States?

A - It is true that there still is discrimination against negroes in some parts of the United States; but, for the country as a whole, great strides have been made in lessening discrimination and in some places and occupations it has disappeared entirely. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed the basic, equal rights of negroes, notably in its recent decisions calling for an end to segregation in the schools. (Some of the American speakers took advantage of this question to raise the issue of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union. Most of the Soviet listeners denied that there was any discrimination against Jews but some tacitly admitted that there was, "at least in Stalin's day.")

Q - How can you have so much class discrimination in the United States and claim to be a democracy?

A - We have relatively little "class" discrimination in the US, perhaps less than anywhere else in the world, including the USSR. In fact, we don't tend to think in terms of "classes." Economically the spread between the bottom and the top people is constantly narrowing and we have a great majority of middle-income people. What you would call our "working" class is generally enjoying a comfortable "middle-class" way of life. You in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, have been developing more and more of class differentiation.

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(The class question, asked many times in various forms, gave several of the more knowledgeable Americans an opportunity to "take off" on the relative class-structure of the USSR and the USA, much to the enlightenment and surprise of the listeners).

Q - Can a poor youngster get a university education?

A - He certainly can. We have many virtually free state universities and our big, rich private universities are heavily endowed so that they offer many free scholarships to able and deserving persons no matter how poor. (Some Americans turned the question to ask how and by what criteria university students are selected in Russia).

Q - How much is the scholarship or "stipend" of a university student?

A - (Answers varied, according to the college experience of the speaker).

Cultural Questions

Q - Do Americans read Russian literature? How about Soviet authors?

A - Of course, as part of the world's great literature: Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, Pushkin, Gogol, Chekhov, Soviet authors are perhaps known to fewer people, but Sholokhov's And Quiet Flows the Don is very popular, and among the well-known are Leonov, Gladkov, Panova and Zoshchenko.

Q - Do you listen to Russian music?

A - And how! Many of the most-played, best-known symphonies, concertos, and other compositions, are Russian

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such as those of Tschaikovsky, Rachmaninoff, Glinka, Mussorgsky and Charkovsky. Also, there are the works of Soviet composers such as Prokofiev and Khatchaturian.

Q - Why didn't you bring an American jazz band?

A - Because we came as individuals. We could not "bring" orchestras or bands with us. Do you like American jazz?

Answers from the listeners - We certainly do, and regard it as the "original" jazz. We know Armstrong, Ellington, Benny Goodman, Stan Kenton. We listen to your jazz over the Voice of America. We now are getting a lot of "rock and roll." (A young American college instructor was approached one evening on the streets of Moscow by a friendly group of young Russian stil-yagi - "zoot-suiters" or "hepcats" - and asked if the American jazz band leader, "Dizzy" Gillespie, was coming to Moscow. When the American said he didn't know the name the Russian youths were amazed at his ignorance, and began to suspect that he wasn't an American after all!

The Russian listeners did not seem to know much, if anything, about more serious American music.

Questions on CPUSA

Q - Why do you persecute the Communist Party in the United States?

A - Who says we persecute it?

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Q - Well, why did they arrest the leaders of the Party?

A - The leaders were convicted of conspiracy to overthrow our form of government. Still, under our Constitution the Communists had the right to appeal, which they exercised. The Supreme Court, ever zealous to protect fundamental constitutional liberties, reversed the lower courts and ruled in favor of the defendants.

Q - Then why did they remain in prison so long?

A - They stayed in prison only long enough for the appeals process to be followed. Even when they were in jail they continued to write articles, and the Party continued to exist. Didn't you receive the Daily Worker for all that period of time? The Communist press continued to function and Dennis even completed a book while in prison.

Q - Is the Communist Party popular in the United States?

A - No, hardly anyone pays attention to it. Why should they? The Communists raise false issues, alter the facts to suit themselves, and talk a language largely incomprehensible to the American public, particularly to the workers to whom they try to address themselves. They talk about mass unemployment when there isn't any, or when unemployment is relatively small. They try to worsen race relations when the Government and the mass of the people are trying hard to find peaceable and evolutionary solutions to the problems of racial discrimination which we frankly admit still exist in some parts of our country. They call the United States "imperialistic" when we all know from the simple facts of the record that this is not so. They try to persuade people that all parties but their own in

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the United States are creatures or puppets of Wall Street, which we all know is an antique and unfounded cliché. They work to reduce the defenses of the United States in the name of "peace" but which, by weakening our position, would only make war more likely.

Q - What do you mean by saying that the Communist Party of the United States takes orders from Moscow? It is an independent though "fraternal" party.

A - It is no secret to anyone that all Communist parties are subordinated to the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow. Don't take my word for it. Read Lenin. Read his speeches at the Eighth through the Eleventh Party Congresses. It's all there. He sets forth very clearly the lines of organization and subordination. That is why there have been repeated schisms in the CPUSA and why there is a particularly bad break now. This is why even so ardent a Communist as Howard Fast left the Party, although in his case it was not merely his disgust with Moscow domination but his revulsion against the growth of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. (Knowledgeable American speakers never lost an opportunity to tell their Soviet listeners about Fast's defection.)

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